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Abstract 
 
 
Abstract entities have long been viewed as entities that lack causal powers; that is, they 
cannot be constitutive of causes or effects. This thesis aims to reject this claim and argue that 
abstract objects are indeed part of the causal order. I will call this thesis ‘AOCO’ for short.  In 
the first chapter I argue that other philosophers have committed themselves to the claim that 
some abstract objects have been caused to come into existence.  In the second chapter, I argue 
that the best solution to Benacerraf’s problem is to concede that abstract objects have a causal 
influence on what we believe.  In the third chapter I examine and evaluate objections to 
AOCO. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Philosophers often take it for granted that abstract objects are not part of the causal 
order. To illustrate this, here is a small sample of philosophers making this claim: 
  
“The negative way: abstract entities have no spatiotemporal location; they 
do not enter into causal interaction; they are never indiscernible from one 
another” (Lewis, 1986a, p.83). 
 
“According to Platonists, mathematical objects are abstract: in other 
words, Platonists think of mathematical objects as neither causally active 
nor spatially located” (Liggins, 2006, p.135). 
 
“There are reasons for supposing that if [abstract] objects exist then they 
lack causal powers and causal properties, or at least the causal power to 
influence human beings. We usually suppose that in order to exert a 
causal influence, an object must do so at some particular time and place, 
and this would not be possible for an object lacking a spatio-temporal 
location” (Cheyne, 2001, p.2). 
 
“[It] is commonly assumed that such abstractions exist necessarily and 
that they cannot stand in causal relations” (Deutsch, 1991, p.210). 
 
“[Abstract] objects, Platonistically construed, are neither causally active 
nor causally acted upon” (Drivers & Miller, 1999, p.308). 
 
“Traditional Platonism is the realist ontology that recognises abstract 
objects, i.e., objects that are nonspatiotemporal and outside the causal 
order” (Linsky & Zalta, 1995, p.525). 
 
“Crudely, we cannot, it appears, come into any kind of direct sensory 
contact with such ‘objects’; we cannot point at them, or spill our coffee on 
2 
 
them… their abstractness just consists, it appears, in a kind of causal 
impotence” (Wright, 1983, p.1).  
 
“[Since] Platonists maintain that mathematical objects exist outside of 
spacetime, they endorse what we may call the principle of causal isolation 
(PCI), which says that there are no causal interactions between 
mathematical and physical objects” (Balaguer, 1998, p.110). 
 
My goal in this thesis is to reject this assumption; that is, I claim that some abstract 
objects are in fact part of the causal order. I will call this thesis the ‘abstract objects in 
the causal order’ thesis or ‘AOCO’ for short. There have been other philosophers who 
have already postulated efficacious abstract objects (though in some cases, these 
philosophers do not want to call these entities abstract). Penelope Maddy for example, 
argues that sets are part the causal order,
1
 whereas Linda Wetzel argues for 
efficacious linguistic types.
2
 AOCO on the other hand goes beyond individual entities; 
it claims that we should reject the general claim that abstract objects are acausal. 
While some philosophers call these entities are concrete,
3
 I argue that we can still 
classify them as abstract. Furthermore, most philosophers take the term ‘Platonist’ to 
be a synonym of ‘abstract’. I will not use ‘Platonist’ to describe causal abstract 
objects because the term is metaphysically loaded. Since Plato describes his abstract 
objects as being in a Platonic heaven outside of space/time
4
 and also acausal, other 
versions of ‘Platonism’ seem to assume similar attributes. The entities I am interested 
in are different and so I will simply refer to them as ‘abstract objects’. 
 
In Chapter 1, I will go through some definitions of what an abstract object is, as well 
as motivating my thesis by showing that philosophers have already postulated 
efficacious abstract entities. These entities do this by being part of causal effects. In 
chapter 2 I show how this argument can solve Benacerraf’s epistemic objection to 
Platonism – a problem that realists have historically struggled with. I will also argue 
that abstract objects should be part of causal effects, largely because of this. Finally, 
in chapter 3, I examine potential counterarguments to AOCO. Abstract objects are 
                                                 
1
 Maddy, 1992. 
2
 Wetzel, 2009. 
3
 Such as Maddy (1992) and Bigelow (1988). 
4
 Plato, ND/2005, p.604-13. 
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part of the causal order. The traditional Platonist definition is outdated and should be 
replaced. 
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1 – Background and Motivation 
 
 
There are two goals in this chapter, the first is to clarify what I mean by ‘abstract 
objects’, ‘existence’ etc. This will be dealt with in 1.1 and 1.2. After that, I will 
motivate AOCO by showing that different philosophers are individually committed to 
abstract objects being within the causal order. They do so by being part of causes, 
despite being abstract objects. 
 
 
1.1. Meta-Ontology 
 
 
Since we are having a discussion based on ontological issues, we need to ask what it 
means for something to exist. Most philosophers take existence and being as the same 
thing. For there to be an apple means that an apple exists. The two are logically 
equivalent and hence their meanings are the same. Philosophers such as Peter Van 
Inwagen have also argued that existence is univocal, meaning that the concept of 
existing is the same, regardless of the object that exists.
5
 He argues this point by 
drawing on the links between the concepts of numbers and existence. We can apply 
the same numbers to count very different types of objects, so existence is univocal.
6
 If 
there have been four major storms in our city, and four people in my family, I can say 
that the number of storms is the same as the number of people in my family. The 
concept of numbers is closely related to the concept of existence. To say that there are 
zero unicorns is to say that unicorns don’t exist. If I own exactly one pair of sneakers, 
then I have one more pair of sneakers than the number of unicorns in this world. This 
may sound odd but we can all agree that it is meaningful. Between the univocal nature 
of numbers and its link to existence, Van Inwagen believes we have good reasons to 
believe that existence is univocal. One may argue against Van Inwagen by pointing to 
all the different properties amongst different objects. My table and the American 
congress both exist, yet they have very different properties. Surely this shows that 
                                                 
5
 Van Inwagen, 1998, p.236. 
6
 Van Inwagen, 1998, p.236. 
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things can exist in different ways. Quine has a response to this, he argues that these 
differences are external to the concept of existence itself.
7
 Imagine if I pointed to a 
flower and a car, then telling my friend that they are both red. My friend looks at me 
with a slightly puzzled look on his face. “Yes, I can see why you may think that they 
are both red, but surely they are not red in the same way! The flower is red because it 
is naturally that colour, whereas the car was just painted red”. My friend would be 
right in one sense but would nonetheless still be saying something odd. I can see that 
the reason that the flower is red is different from the reason that the car is, but that 
does not mean that they don’t share a colour. They are both red regardless of the 
differences my friend listed. In a similar light, different objects can have their 
existence exemplified in different ways, yet these are not strictly different ways of 
existing.  
 
Famously, Quine has argued that the objects we claim to exist can be spotted through 
the use of an existential quantifier – ‘∃’.8 ‘∃x’ means that there is one or more x, 
where ‘x’ is any object. Since being and existence are logically equivalent, ‘∃x’ 
means that x exists. Quine thus has a method for us to spot entities that we are 
ontologically committed to. First, we need to identify statements and theories that we 
believe to be true; we can then see what these theories are ontologically committed to. 
A theory is ontologically committed to Fs iff the theory entails or implies that there 
are Fs. Furthermore, as individuals, one is ontologically committed to Fs iff one 
believes a theory that is ontologically committed to Fs. What does it mean for a theory 
to entail or imply that there are Fs? Different philosophers say different things about 
this entailment or implication relation, for Quine, we investigate what a theory implies 
there is by a) putting the theory in the language of first order logic, b) listing all the 
theorems of the theory, and then c) looking for all statements that begin with the form 
“F exists”.9 
 
For example, say one of the theorems is that 2 is an even number. In first order logic, 
that may be translated as “∃x(Tx&Ex)” where “Tx” means that x is 2 and “Ex” means 
that x is an even number. As a statement, this can now be read as “x exists, x is 2 and x 
                                                 
7
 Quine, 1948, p.23. 
8
 Quine, 1960, p.242. 
9
 Quine, 1960, p.238-43. 
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is even”. According to Quine, we are currently ontologically committed to the number 
2 as an existing object. Given this commitment, we may or may not wish to continue 
postulating that these things exist. From here we have three options: 
 
i) Accept these entities as part of our ontology. 
ii) Stop committing to the theories that commit us to their existence. 
iii) Paraphrase these ontological commitments away.10 
 
In other words we can either choose to accept these objects, change our theories and 
language so we don’t refer to objects we don’t believe in, or deny their existence. The 
paraphrasing idea can be explained like this: when we make statements such as ‘there 
is a number between 2 and 4’, if we don’t want to say that the number 3 actually 
exists as an abstract object, we may choose to paraphrase this statement away. What 
we really mean when we say that ‘there is a number between 2 and 4’ is something 
like ‘if you have more than two, but less than four whole things, you have three of 
them’. The new sentence is supposed to be logically equivalent to the original. We are 
now no longer ontologically committed to the existence of the number 3, but we’re 
still expressing the same thing. Philosophers who believe in the existence of an object 
are called realists, whereas ones who denounce the existence of an object are called 
anti-realists. Nominalists are philosophers who don’t believe in the existence of any 
abstract objects.  
 
Though the Quinean method is well accepted in general, it is not without objections. 
William Alston for example objects to the paraphrasing option. His argument is as 
follows, the anti-realists according to Quine are supposed to paraphrase away 
ontologically problematic statements with logically equivalent ones that do not 
postulate these entities. However, how can two statements, one postulating the 
existence of an object, another denying it, mean the same thing? This seems to be a 
natural contradiction, either the two propositions say different things, in which they 
contain different ontological commitments, or they say the same thing, in which case 
they have the same ontological commitment and so the Quinean paraphrase has 
                                                 
10
 Quine, 1960, p.129-34. 
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failed.
11
 A reasonable anti-realist paraphrase is hence impossible, and not a true 
option for Quine’s quandary.  
 
Furthermore, Alston says that there is a fundamental problem with this process of 
admitting the existence of objects.
12
 When I make propositions such as ‘there is a 
good chance that he will come’, am I really making any sort of ontological 
commitment? In everyday language, whether or not I am ontologically committed to 
these entities does not even come to mind. We certainly should not deem anyone 
making such an utterance an abstract realist by default. The only thing the paraphrase 
is good for is that it allows one to escape the urge to ask metaphysical questions that 
come with ontological commitments. That is, now that I am aware of my ontological 
commitments, I can replace the earlier proposition with say, “he will probably come”. 
Now I will not have to urge to ask metaphysical questions such as if possibilities exist 
within space/time or if they are causal.
13
  
 
To Alston, questions of what exists are ‘less than parlour games’.14 Therefore, he is 
not only objecting to Quine, he is denying the usefulness of ontological debates in 
general. In response, all I can say is that Alston’s interest simply differs from other 
philosophers, including myself, who partake in this debate. Given that we want to 
continue this discussion, perhaps there is still something to be said about the problem 
of paraphrasing. The solution is simple, rather than claiming that paraphrases retain 
the meaning of statements completely, we simply claim that it retains all meaning of 
the original, barring the objects we are ontologically committed to. This solution is so 
simple, it almost seems shallow or lazy. However there is no real reason why it should 
not be employed. After all, we know that this is what the Quinean paraphrases are 
supposed to give us. The point was never to retain all meanings of the proposition, 
including the ontology, which would make the exercise pointless. In response to 
Alston’s second objection, I argue that just because we are not thinking of ontological 
issues when we make these abstract statements, that does not mean that we are not 
seriously ontologically committed to them. Or perhaps we’re not, but that’s something 
                                                 
11
 Alston, 1958, p.10. 
12
 Alston, 1958, p.11. 
13
 Alston, 1958, p.17. 
14
 Alston, 1958, p.11. 
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we can sort out through Quine’s methodology. Whether or not we are really 
ontologically committed to these entities due to our language is almost irrelevant. 
 
In his 1980 paper Ontological Commitment and Paraphrase, Frank Jackson gives 
Quine another puzzle. Take the proposition “S is ontologically committed to K’s” 
where S is a statement and K’s are objects whose existences are in question. To put 
this proposition in a logical form would inevitably involve the existential quantifier 
‘∃’followed by ‘K’. It is possible for a nominalist to state that proposition while 
describing another philosopher being committed to abstract object K, but note that in 
saying that “S is ontologically committed to K’s”, he/she is automatically committed 
to the existence of K’s, even before any debates over K occurred and despite 
nominalists believing in no abstract objects at all.
15
 Jackson then suggests that we 
should not look for ontological commitment through pure semantics and existential 
quantifiers, instead we should look at “one’s preparedness to express one’s sentences 
in terms of the semantic relation of being true of or application”.16 For example, I am 
not ontologically committed to the existence of Harry Potter when I say ‘Harry Potter 
is a fictional wizard’, I am only committed if I agree that there is something that ‘is a 
fictional wizard’ applies to. An anti-realist of fictional characters for example would 
say no, she does not believe that this applies to any subject so she is not ontologically 
committed to Harry Potter. Jackson’s objection to the Quinean method is very 
reasonable, since ontological commitments are about having references in the world, 
rather than purely linguistic notations. However, it is not strong enough to reject 
Quine’s methodology. The existential quantifiers are only supposed to give us a 
starting point ontologically. Once again, we need to first notice that we are 
linguistically committed to the existence of Harry Potter and only then should we ask 
“OK, but are we really committed to this”. The use of existential quantifiers really 
does not restrict us in the way Jackson thinks it does.  
 
Quine’s three options are not the only solutions; there is a fourth option for us that has 
been developed after Quine. This is the fictionalist option. Fictionalism can be used as 
a brand of anti-realism that does not completely undermine the usefulness of realism. 
For example, in his 2001 paper Go Figure: A Path through Fictionalism, Stephen 
                                                 
15
 Jackson, 1980, p.305. 
16
 Jackson, 1980, p.310. 
9 
 
Yablo claims that we can make statements and theories that seemingly refer to 
abstract objects while remaining anti-realists. We do this by treating these statements 
or theories as hypotheticals or make-believe. For example,  
 
‘Sherlock Holmes is a great detective’  
 
should be read according to the fictionalist as:  
 
‘Based on the Doyle novels, Holmes is a great detective’.  
 
We can hence talk about Sherlock Holmes as though we are realists without really 
postulating the existence of fictional characters. In other words, we can make 
statements in the form of ‘∃xFx’ without truly asserting ‘∃x’. 
 
There are many forms of fictionalism, each with its own differences but with the same 
spirit. A general division we can make between forms of fictionalism are the 
hermeneutic and revolutionary theories.
17
 According to the hermeneutic fictionalists, 
claims such as ‘Holmes is a great detective’ are already make-belief statements that 
are not really committed to the existence of abstract objects. Contrast this with 
revolutionary fictionalism; according to which speakers are truly committed to the 
existence of Sherlock Holmes for example. What makes them fictionalists is the fact 
that they think we should change this and treat these assertions as make-believe.
18
 For 
an example of hermeneutic fictionalism, see Gideon Rosen’s Modal Fictionalism 
(1990). Hartry Field’s Science without Numbers (1980) is no doubt the most well 
known example of revolutionary fictionalism. 
 
Regardless of the fictionalist’s hermeneutic or revolutionary bends, he/she would still 
have a specific strategy when it comes to their form of fictionalism. Yablo gives us 
many options. I will give a quick survey of these strategies: 
 
1. Instrumentalist fictionalism 
 
                                                 
17
 These terms were originally dubbed by Burgess, 1983, p.96. 
18
 Refer to Burgess (1983) or the Stanford Encyclopaedia entry for more reading.  
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According to the instrumentalist, the statement quantifying over dubious objects 
should be read as make-believe. What is missing from this account however is how 
this statement should be read.
19
 This creates problems for the fictionalist, since it 
seems reasonable to ask them what the sentence really means, given that it is make-
believe.
20
 
 
2. Meta-fictionalism 
 
Let ‘s’ be any statement asserting an abstract object. According to meta-fictionalism, 
to assert s is really just to say that s would be the right thing to assert given the make-
believe world involved. For example, to assert that ‘Sherlock Holmes is a great 
detective’ is really just to assert that ‘Sherlock Holmes is a great detective according 
to Doyle’s novels’.21 
 
3. Object fictionalism 
 
According to this form of fictionalism, the statements referring to dubious objects are 
really just referencing non-controversial ones. The statement ‘the number of cows is 
3’ is not really ontologically committed to the number 3, it is just another way of 
saying ‘there are three cows’. 
 
4. Reflexive fictionalism 
 
Object fictionalism assumes that we introduce something just to talk about concrete 
objects, but that’s only half the story. Sometimes we are just talking about concreta, 
but at other times we are actually talking about the abstract objects. Take the 
nominalist statement ‘numbers do not exist’. Surely, it would be a wrong for a 
fictionalist about numbers to believe that this sentence is referencing concrete objects. 
Reflexive fictionalism states that one can switch between talking about abstract 
objects sincerely and fictionally.
22
 
 
                                                 
19
 Yablo, 2001, p.74. 
20
 Yablo, 2001, p.74-5. Burgess, 1983, p.1. 
21
 Yablo, 2001, p.75-6. 
22
 Yablo, 2001, p.80-2. 
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5. Relative reflexive fictionalism 
 
Yablo believes that reflexive fictionalism does not really benefit anyone. The 
nominalists would rather not talk about abstract objects at all, because according to 
them there aren’t any. The Platonists on the other hand don’t need fictionalism to talk 
about abstract objects. They believe that these entities exist, so why not just talk about 
them directly? Rather than slipping between concrete and abstract entities, Yablo 
suggests that we allow fictionalists to slip between engaging and disengaging the 
fiction. This way, the nominalist can escape talking about numbers for example when 
talking about philosophy, but still engage in the number-fiction when doing 
mathematics.
23
 This is the crux of relative reflexive fictionalism.  
 
Fictionalism can function as a powerful brand of anti-realism because it can maintain 
a lot of the explanatory power that realism provides without the ontological baggage. 
However it is important to note that one can be a fictionalist without being an anti-
realist about the object in question. Just because we are engaging with make-belief x’s 
does not mean that x’s do not exist. Rather, it just means that we are agnostic about 
x’s. This gives fictionalism additional value. It is a very useful and versatile solution 
to Quine’s quandary, one that allows us to escape from the ontological commitments 
of our accepted theories. 
 
With this mind, I will now show how we are committed to certain abstract objects 
according to the Quinean method, and how these abstract objects are in fact part of the 
causal order.  
 
 
1.2. Definitions of ‘Abstract’ 
 
 
There are many ways of defining what exactly an abstract object is. David Lewis 
provides us with many ways of doing so.
24
 We will discuss what he calls the way of 
                                                 
23
 Yablo, 2001, p.82-3. 
24
 Lewis, 1986, p.81-6. 
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example, the way of negation, the way of abstraction and the way of conflation. 
Furthermore, we will look into Michael Dummett’s way of ostension.25 These 
methods are just supposed to be different options for us, depending on the purposes of 
the debate. Different entities will be categorised as abstract depending on our mode of 
definition. The term ‘abstract’ is ambiguous, but nonetheless there are examples of 
causal abstract objects regardless of which definition we adopt. We therefore have 
reasons to adopt AOCO – the thesis that abstract objects are part of the causal order. 
 
 
1.2.1. The Way of Example 
 
 
“First, the Way of Example: Concrete entities are things like donkeys and 
puddles and protons and stars, whereas abstract entities are things like 
numbers” (Lewis, 1986a, p.82).   
 
According to the way of example, one doesn’t even try to give an analytical 
explanation to the abstract/concrete distinction. Instead, one goes straight to the 
paradigm examples eg. ‘donkeys are concrete, numbers are abstract etc.’. What 
justifies this lack of analysis is that there may not be any one concept that links all 
abstract objects. The advantage of this way is that what is abstract will be precisely 
what we paradigmatically call abstract. With the way of example, there will never be 
entities that we standardly believe to be abstract objects that get miscategorised. This 
cannot be said for all the other definitions, which we will discuss later. However, the 
downside to the way of example is precisely that it offers no explanation as to why 
something is identified as being abstract. For example, in this debate, if there is 
nothing that unifies abstract objects, it would be hard to find a reason why these 
entities cannot be part of the causal order. We may not want to call the way of 
example a definition at all, given that it does not try to explain the term and merely 
gives examples. Some paradigm cases of abstract objects are: properties, sets, 
propositions, numbers, and universals. Many of these paradigm cases have already 
been postulated as part of the causal order and I will explain that in depth later. 
                                                 
25
 Dummett, 1973, p.471-511. 
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1.2.2. The Way of Conflation 
 
 
“Second, the Way of Conflation: the distinction between concrete and 
abstract entities is just the distinction between individuals and sets, or 
between particulars and universals, or perhaps between particular 
individuals and everything else” (Lewis, 1986a, p.83). 
 
‘Conflation’ is defined as two objects or concepts merging until they seem to be one 
combined entity. The way of conflation involves the idea that all abstract entities can 
be ultimately reduced to sets or universals. It certainly seems unlikely in this day and 
age that philosophers would be mistaking one abstract object for another,
26
 but there 
may be a more charitable interpretation to the way of conflation. Burgess and Rosen 
have an elegant explanation.
27
 A philosopher may believe in the existence of a few 
abstract objects, yet still want to minimise her ontology as much as possible. 
Therefore she tries to reduce some abstract objects to others. For example, John 
Bigelow has argued that numbers are universals.
28
 One may also be tempted to reduce 
numbers to sets. The way of conflation takes this idea and runs with it. Abstract 
objects are entities that can be reduced to universals or sets (or perhaps just cannot be 
reduced to particular individuals), whereas concrete objects can be reduced to 
particulars or individuals.  
  
It is doubtful that all abstract objects can be reduced to sets or universals. Tropes for 
example are different from universals because the former is unique and the latter is 
not.
29
 If anything, universals should be reducible to tropes, for tropes are finer grained 
than the general universals. It would also be difficult to reduce tropes to sets. Let’s 
apply this to an example and attempt to reduce the colour of my car (construed as a 
                                                 
26
 Rosen, 2012. 
27
 Burgess & Rosen, 1997, p.19. 
28
 Bigelow, 1988. 
29
 Williams, 1953a p.4-6. Tropes are not paradigmatically abstract because they exist within 
space/time. However, some tropes do qualify as abstract under the ways of ostension and abstraction. 
This will be discussed further in 1.3.4. 
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trope of course) to a set. The set can only have one member, because tropes are 
specific. What would this member be? The obvious suggestion would be my car. 
However, my car has many different properties and this creates problems for us. Let’s 
now try to reduce the speed of my car to a set. Once again, since we are talking about 
tropes, the set must only have one member. What is the one member of this set? My 
car? This is problematic. What is the difference between my car’s speed and its 
colour? According to a set-theoretic view of tropes, these two properties are exactly 
the same! Both of them are one-membered sets, that one member being my car. Yet 
we would not want to accept this conclusion, surely the speed and the colour of my 
car are two separate properties. It should be obvious then that we cannot reduce tropes 
to sets. If tropes are abstract, this is problematic. Of course, one may simply choose to 
classify tropes as concrete and retain the way of conflation. 
 
Burgess and Rosen have an additional objection to this way. It is one thing for all 
abstract entities to be reducible to universals or sets, it is quite another claim to say 
that they are abstract because they can be reduced in this way.
30
 Why would being a 
universal or set in itself make something abstract? Furthermore, why are sets and 
universals abstract in the first place? Simply because they are universals or sets? That 
is circular and gives us no better explanation than the way of example.  
 
The way of conflation is not a very popular one, but is still worth considering. I will 
argue later that sets are entities capable of causal interaction and thus, there are no 
problems with the way of conflation in conjunction with AOCO. 
 
 
1.2.3. The Way of Abstraction 
 
 
“The Way of Abstraction: abstract entities are abstractions from concrete 
entities. They result from somehow subtracting specifity, so that an 
incomplete description of the original concrete entity would be a complete 
description of the abstraction” (Lewis, 1986a, p.85). 
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This way of distinguishing the abstract from the concrete references how philosophers 
have historically defined abstract entities. Burgess and Rosen argue that this would be 
a mistake. Discussions about abstraction historically were about mental instantiations 
of abstract objects, or the mental process of abstraction.
31
 However, both the mental 
representations and the process of abstraction should not be confused with the objects 
themselves.  
 
One way to make sense of the way of abstraction is to view it as the products of 
abstraction, where abstraction is the process of seeing two white things for example, 
and mentally creating the object ‘whiteness’. This view has some intuitive value, 
unfortunately it also depends on an outdated theory of mind.
32
 Alternatively, Burgess 
and Rosen suggest that the way of abstraction could be read as follows:  
 
“not that abstracta are the products of a mental process of selective 
inattention, but that they are the kinds of objects that psychologistically 
inclined philosophers of earlier times erroneously took to be such 
products” (p.19, 1997, Burgess & Rosen).  
 
However, this is not much better. Why would the abstract or concrete status of objects 
be subject to the mistakes of past philosophers? That tells us more about errors in past 
ways of thinking than it does about the nature of entities.  
 
That does not mean that the way of abstraction is doomed. Crispin Wright, Harold 
Noonan and Bob Hale take this idea and tweak it.
33
 According to them, abstract 
entities are the referents of abstract ideas. Their models involve the concept of 
equivalence relations.  
 
Take any property that we use in everyday language, such as ‘the colour of the table’. 
Let ‘a’ and ‘b’ be objects, let ‘F’ be the property in question, let ‘Fa’ be that property 
                                                 
31
 Burgess & Rosen, 1997, p.17-8. 
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 Wright, 1983, p.27. Rosen, 2012. 
33
 Hale (1987), Wright (1983), Noonan (1978). I find Hale’s version the most well thought out and 
persuasive, so our discussion will be focused around his formulation. 
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in a, let ‘Fb’ be that property in b and finally let and ‘Rab’ be an equivalence relation 
between a and b that explains F. We can analyse properties in the following way: 
 
Fa = Fb if and only if Rab. 
 
For example,  
 
The direction of a = the direction of b iff a is parallel to b. 
 
We are hence giving a definition of the property through a relation. This can be done 
for any property that holds between different objects. Note that not all properties are 
abstract, some can be concrete. For example, the property of being a father can be 
formulated as 
 
The father of a = the father of b iff either a and b are siblings or a and b are step-
siblings and the mother of a ≠ the mother of b. 
 
The difference between abstract and concrete objects is a difference in the 
equivalence relation. More specifically, if there can be two instantiations of a 
property in two different places at the same time, then the property is abstract. Hale 
uses the example of types and tokens.
34
 The first and the fourth word of this sentence 
are of the same type, but not the same token.  From this, we can see that the two 
tokens of the word are not the same, but separate words. However, both words are of 
the same type and therefore, the same type can be exemplified at different places at 
the same time. Hale says that the way of abstraction is thus a cousin of the 
spatiotemporal distinction. He adds that this equivalence relation must be a grounding 
relation for the object, that is,  
 
 
“R grounds F iff, for any statement of identity linking F-denoting terms, 
there is some statement to the effect that R holds among certain things, the 
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truth of which is (logically) necessary and sufficient for the truth of that 
statement of F-identity” (Hale, 1987, p.59).   
 
For example, with the case of roundness again, we can explain the concept through 
two round objects and an equivalence relation – being the same shape. This relation 
can hold among different objects at different points in time, so roundness is abstract. 
Note that the spatial condition is essential.
35
 Hale illustrates this point by showing 
how a concrete object can be misclassified as abstract. Imagine that we wanted to find 
out if fathers are abstract. According to the previous formulation, the grounding 
relation is siblinghood, which can hold between different people. This would 
misclassify fathers as abstract, according to Hale. However, if we analyse fathers for 
example with ‘x begat a and y begat b and x is the same human being as y’, where 
‘x’and ‘y’ are also people, then we can define fathers without having the one same 
equivalence relation between many different objects. It would hence fail to meet the 
spatial separation criterion. Since we need this criterion to be met for all of its 
grounding relations in order to call it abstract, it is correctly typed as concrete.
36
 
Another problem that Hale brings up is that sometimes, abstract objects have 
grounding relations bound over things that have no spatial location, such as concepts 
or other abstract objects. He simply fixes this problem by adding a further condition, 
somewhat forcefully into his thesis. He ends up with two different ways of expressing 
the criteria. 
 
“F is an abstract sortal iff, for any R that grounds F, either  
(i) R cannot hold between spatially located items at all,  
or (ii) R can hold between things which are spatially, but not temporally, 
separated” (Hale, 1987, p.61). 
 
The condition added to deal with non-spatial objects is obviously condition (i). Take 
the concept of being a prime number. Whatever the equivalence relation is for this 
concept, it is not one that can hold among spatially located objects. It can only hold 
between numbers, which do not have spatial properties.  
 
                                                 
35
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There are consequences to defining the abstract through equivalence relations - not all 
objects that we may want to call abstract can be reduced to them. For example, how 
would we define fictional characters using equivalence relations? What objects would 
this equivalence relation hold between? The answer certainly is not clear, nor does it 
seem to be an intuitive model. Therefore, under this method of defining the abstract, 
fictional characters should be defined as concrete, which may not be a consequence 
we would want to accept. Regardless of how we want to formalise this definition or 
whether or not we agree with it, this method does not clash with efficacious abstract 
objects. Much like the way of conflation and abstraction, types are considered abstract 
here. I will make a case for types being part of the causal order and given that they 
are, abstract objects are part of the causal order under this definition. 
 
 
1.2.4. The Way of Ostension 
 
 
Michael Dummett gives an interesting method in which we may make the 
abstract/concrete distinction. His suggestion is that concrete objects can be pointed 
out ostensively, but this is not the case for abstract entities. For example we can point 
to a tree and make a reference to it, as we can for tables, chairs, people, shadows and 
an infinitely many number of concrete objects. Abstract objects however cannot be 
pointed out ostensively; instead we have to rely on its functional basis to ‘point them 
out’. For example, we may describe a square as ‘the shape of a window’ or the 
number zero as ‘the number of snakes in the New Zealand”. There needs to be a 
functional expression written in the form of ‘the x of a’. Where ‘x’ and ‘a’ are objects, 
with ‘x’ being the potentially abstract object in question.  
 
x can be an object of ostension → x is concrete. 
x cannot be an object of ostension & x can be picked out through functional 
expression → x is abstract.37 
 
                                                 
37
 Dummett, 1973, p.481. 
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Dummett realises that not all concrete objects can be objects of ostension if we take 
ostension to literally involve a pointing gesture. It would be just about impossible to 
point out a colourless, odourless gas for example, yet it remains concrete.
38
 This is 
why the first condition cannot be put as a biconditional. Furthermore, Dummett does 
not want colourless gasses for example to be misclassified as abstract. This is why the 
second condition is needed. We can see how certain abstract entities may not satisfy 
the antecedent of this second condition. It is unlikely that fictional character for 
example could be picked out through a functional expression. Therefore the second 
condition cannot be put as a biconditional either. 
 
There are hence certain abstract objects that cannot be classified as concrete using the 
way of ostension. Hale comments on this part of Dummett’s theory and argues that it 
is not a big problem. At the very least it sets up clear barriers between the abstract and 
concrete because being able to be expressed as a functional expression may 
necessitate that it cannot be an object of ostension.
39
 
 
David Lewis objects to the way of ostension in a footnote of On the Plurality of 
Worlds. He argues that even if this way can help us distinguish between the abstract 
and the concrete, it does not tell us anything about the nature of abstract and concrete 
entities. “It is like saying that snakes are the animals that we instinctively most fear – 
maybe so, but it tells us nothing about the nature of snakes” (Lewis, 1986a, p.82). 
This may be true, but it is still worth considering. For one, Lewis’ way of example 
does even less in terms of telling us about the nature of the objects in question, yet it 
is still mentioned when philosophers ponder how to distinguish between the abstract 
and the concrete.  
 
A more pressing problem is the fact that this analysis cannot define abstract objects 
through a biconditional. Dummett himself admits that this model can only give 
sufficient but not necessary conditions of the abstract and concrete. Nonetheless, this 
seems to make a very good distinction. As a result, any paradigmatically abstract 
object will be correctly defined. If any paradigmatically abstract objects are causal, 
they will be classified as such under Dummett’s way of ostension. 
                                                 
38
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1.2.5. The Way of Negation 
 
 
“The negative way: abstract entities have no spatiotemporal location; they 
do not enter into causal interaction; they are never indiscernible from one 
another” (Lewis, 1986a, p.83). 
 
The way of negation is one of the most popular methods to make the abstract/concrete 
distinction. The thought is that abstract objects lack certain qualities which concrete 
objects have, and that is what makes them different. In fact the most common method 
of making the abstract/concrete distinction is to argue that abstract objects do not have 
spatiotemporal properties, and that they have no causal powers. It is important to note 
that philosophers don’t tend to define abstract objects first and foremost as being non-
efficacious; they define them as being non-spatiotemporal and only then do they make 
the inference that they are acausal. 
 
We will start with the spatiotemporal condition. It makes no sense to ask where the 
number 2 is or when beauty was first created. This does not necessarily mean that the 
number 2 somehow exists in a Platonic heaven outside the spatiotemporal realm, it 
simply makes no sense to talk about where a number is. Because of their non-
spatiotemporal nature, abstract objects are supposedly acausal, in every sense of the 
word. They can neither be causes nor effects.
40
 Why are abstract objects acausal? The 
standard reason given is that in order for something to have any causal influence it 
must exist within space/time. How else is something supposed to interact with other 
objects?
41
 This link between not having spatiotemporal properties and being acausal is 
certainly not a clear one. There is a debate on whether or not objects are required to be 
in space/time in order to cause anything. This will be discussed further in chapter 3. 
We shall hence focus on the non-spatiotemporal condition when discussing the way of 
negation, as it does seem to be the more central one.  
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It is noteworthy that the indiscernibility condition is rarely mentioned amongst 
philosophers, despite the way of negation being widely accepted. Though the 
literature explains why one would want to adopt the claim that abstract objects are 
acausal based on their non-spatiotemporal nature, it is hard to find a similar reason for 
indiscernibility. Many things do not exist in space/time, yet we can tell them apart. 
Neither Harry Potter nor Sherlock Holmes have these spatiotemporal properties for 
example, yet we rarely mistaken them for each other. There are many other properties 
which are unique to them, for example, one is attributed as a wizard and the other as a 
detective. They have different properties, thus they are discernible. Perhaps the way 
of negation is better viewed as a collection of three isolated claims. We could just 
argue that indiscernibility, being non-spatiotemporal and acausal are different ways of 
separating the abstract and the concrete.  
 
 
The way of negation in terms of being non-spatiotemporal and acausal is the most 
popular way of distinguishing the abstract from the concrete, probably because of 
how many paradigm cases it ‘correctly’ identifies. This is especially true if we drop 
the temporal condition. Not surprisingly, there are only so many counterexamples to 
the way of negation.  Fictional characters for example are created at some point in 
time according to creationists, yet they are abstract.
42
 If we are hesitant to call 
fictional characters and other similar objects concrete, we may not want to adopt the 
way of negation. 
 
The term ‘abstract’ is ambiguous, so I will not argue for one way of making the 
distinction over another. For our purposes, the definition will not matter much, as 
there are causal entities under each of the proposed definitions for being abstract. 
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1.3. Abstract Objects in the Causal Sphere 
 
 
Why should we accept AOCO? This may seem like a controversial thesis but causal 
abstract entities have already been argued for by philosophers. These abstract objects 
are consequences of concrete events and will be discussed in depth. For each method 
of defining the abstract we can find different abstract entities within the causal sphere. 
 
 
1.3.1. Fictional Entities 
 
 
Fictional Characters such as Harry Potter, Sherlock Holmes and Peter Parker are often 
described as being abstract entities. We make references to fictional entities all the 
time. For example, I may say that “Harry Potter is a wizard” or “Sherlock Holmes is a 
brilliant detective”. I believe these statements to be true, so according to Quine, I am 
now ontologically committed to the existence of fictional characters. As Van Inwagen 
puts it, 
 
“[These] sentences, if they are translated in the obvious way into the 
language of formal logic, will yield sentences that begin with ‘∃x x is a 
character and...’. Therefore, anyone who believes that what these sentences 
say is literally true and who accepts what seems to be the obvious formal 
translations of these sentences, accepts the thesis that there are fictional 
characters” (Van Inwagen, 1983, p.73). 
 
Realists of fictional characters believe that these entities exist and these realists are 
often creationists – they believe that fictional characters were created by their authors 
in every sense of the word. Of course, just because realists believe in the existence of 
these characters, that does not mean that they believe we can actually go meet 
Sherlock Holmes or Harry Potter. These realists are not delusional people who think 
these characters are not simply part of fiction. What realists believe is simply that 
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when we make claims about fictional characters, there is in fact a subject in which we 
are referring to.  
 
“Mrs. Gamp appears to have incompatible properties. For consider the 
properties: being a woman [and] having been created by Dickens. . . . [O]n 
the theory I am proposing, Mrs. Gamp has only the second of these 
properties” (Van Inwagen, 1977, 308). 
 
Since fictional characters are created by their authors, these entities are examples of 
abstract objects which are within the causal sphere. Creationism is the dominant view 
within realists of fictional characters. It would be an odd view to claim that fictional 
characters were not created at some time. How is it feasible to claim that Harry Potter 
existed even before the birth of J.K. Rowling? It would be odd to claim that fictional 
characters somehow exist necessarily. In fact, if any fictional character exists 
necessarily, all fictional characters, even ones that will never be spoken of or written 
about would exist necessarily. Here is the reason, if an author does not take any part 
in the creation of a fictional character, how would we distinguish fictional characters 
that were actually created from ones that were not? Surely, we do not want to suggest 
that the characters that are used and will be used in actual works of fiction just happen 
to perfectly align with the fictional characters that exist within some abstract realm. If 
realism is true for fictional characters, creationism seems like the most reasonable 
position. 
 
 
This means that there are efficacious abstract entities within some definitions of the 
abstract. Fictional characters are classified concrete by some definitions, but not all. 
They lack spatiotemporal locations and are therefore abstract according to the way of 
negation. It seems feasible to reduce fictional characters to universals as they can be 
viewed as objects that are exemplified at different locations in the same time. If this is 
an adequate account, fictional characters will be abstract under the way of conflation. 
The way of ostension is a little more problematic. It is possible to point to Harry 
Potter on the silver screen, but it is not possible to point to him in a book. Does that 
make him a possible object of ostension or not? This is a mystery. Finally, the way of 
abstraction has fictional entities as concrete, as it would be difficult to pick out some 
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equivalence relation from Sherlock Holmes or Peter Parker.  Nevertheless, fictional 
characters serve as a strong case of abstract entities being part of the causal order. 
 
 
1.3.2. Linguistic Types 
 
 
Other examples of abstract objects within the causal sphere are linguistic types. If 
someone asks whether or not the ninth and the eleventh words of this sentence are the 
same, how would you answer? In one sense they are the same – they are both the 
word ‘the’, but in another sense they’re not - they are two separate splodges of ink 
found on different points on the page. This illustrates the difference between a 
linguistic type and a token. In the example, we have one type but two tokens. They 
are two examples of the one word type – ‘the’.44  
 
We are ontologically committed to linguistic types. Take statements such as “How do 
you spell ‘addiction’?” or “the word ‘apple’ is pronounced with a short-A sound”. We 
often have statements we believe in where types play the role of the object 
linguistically. In chapter 1 of her book Types and Tokens: On Abstract Objects, Linda 
Wetzel provides an extraordinarily long list of examples of this form involving 
linguistic types. She also agrees that we are committed to their existence based on 
Quine’s methodology. 
 
“Type talk is pandemic. It is not occasional; it is not unusual; it is the 
norm…We have to face the responsibilities posed by such talk of types: 
either concede that types exist, or give a systematic semantics for claims 
apparently referring to types. This book attempts to make the case for the 
greater plausibility of conceding that they exist” (Wetzel, 2009, p.21-22). 
 
Wetzel argues that types are within our causal sphere. Words mean what the members 
of the linguistic community want those words to mean. The word ‘cake’ for example 
has a certain meaning and is pronounced in certain ways because the English speaking 
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world decided at some point that it would be that way and this has been practiced over 
a period of time. Therefore there is no mystery as to how we interact with such 
objects.
45
 
 
Furthermore, after we decide on the meanings of words, we obviously go and use 
them. Wetzel is therefore proposing an abstract object that can be both part of causes 
and effects. This model for linguistic types has many appeals. First of all it allows 
realists to account for the role the linguistic community plays in the formation of 
words. It just seems obviously true that words are defined and changed by people who 
use them. The traditional Platonist model simply gives us unintuitive results. To say 
that the properties of words, including their existence is completely independent and 
isolated from us is a proposition that leaves us scratching our heads.
46
 This model 
allows us to explain language as an ongoing and organic process. This is a brand of 
realism that involves abstract objects being very active causally. 
 
It is important to note that linguistic types are classified as abstract under every 
definition we’ve looked at. Once again, these entities are abstract according to the 
way of example. They lack spatiotemporal properties and are therefore abstract under 
the way of negation. Like fictional characters, they may perhaps be reduced to 
universals. Therefore, we get similar results with the way of conflation. The way of 
ostension has word types categorised as abstract. Though it is possible to pick out a 
word token ostensibly, we cannot do the same to a word type. We would need to use a 
functional expression eg. 'the word that appears on the first line of Hamlet’. In 
reference to the way of abstraction, we can define word types through equivalence 
relations as follows: let W1 and W2 be different word tokens. Then W1 is the same 
word type as W2 iff W1 and W2 can be swapped without there being any major 
differences in meaning, according to the linguistic community. This is of course only 
one rough and unpolished way in which followers of Noonan and Hale could analyse 
word types. I am certain that they could analyse linguistic types in a more adequate 
fashion. It is enough for our purposes to just show that this sort of formalisation could 
be convincing. Linguistic types therefore act as a strong example case for every 
common definition of the abstract.  
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1.3.3. Sets 
 
 
Sets are another example of abstract objects within the causal sphere. A set is simply a 
collection of different objects eg. five different crayons may form the set of crayons 
on my table. Note that sets can be made up of all sorts of objects; my loyalty and my 
officemate’s loyalty may form the set of loyalties in our office. Penelope Maddy has 
demonstrated how the use of sets could help us explain mathematical phenomena. 
 
“Now suppose you take a set theoretic perspective and again ask why 
multiplication is commutative. Here an answer is forth-coming: because if 
A and B are sets, then there is a one-to-one correspondence between the 
Cartesian products A x B and B x A” (Maddy, 1981, p.499). 
 
We therefore have theories we believe to be true that are based on the use of sets. By 
the Quinean method, we are currently ontologically committed to the existence of 
sets. 
 
As long as concrete objects form part of a set, this abstract object can be part of the 
effect caused by only concreta. For example, if I put all my crayons in a bag, the set 
of crayons now have the property of being in my bag. When my sister was born in 
1994, the set containing all of my family members gained a new member. Sets 
therefore seem to be good examples of abstract objects within the causal order.  
 
One may object that this assumes that sets are located in the same place as its 
members. That is fair enough, but we have a strong argument for efficacious sets, 
even if this is not true. In 1994, my only sister was born, so since 1994, the set of my 
sister(s) has existed containing only one member. Here’s the question: what was the 
set like before 1994? Did it even exist? There are three possible answers for this: 
 
a) The set was exactly the same. It existed as a one-member set. 
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b) The set existed but had no members. It was the null-set ∅. 
c) The set did not exist. 
 
For us to make sense of (a), we would need to accept a four-dimensionalist theory of 
time. A presentist account leads to odd consequences. The set of {my sister(s) at a 
particular point in time before 1994} would only have one member, despite me being 
an only child then. This just seems wrong, because the presentist cannot make 
references to any sisters I will have in the future. They therefore cannot explain how I 
could possibly have a sister while being an only child. A four-dimensionalist account 
however has no such problems. They explain (a) as follows, let us assume that I will 
only ever have one sister. If we looked at a timeline and searched for the number of 
sisters I will ever have, we would find that I only have one sister. The set of my sisters 
will hence always be one-membered.  This account assumes a four-dimensionalist 
theory of time however, which would not appeal to everyone. Here is a bigger 
problem: If anyone asked me before 1994 how many members there were in the set of 
my sister(s), I would say none. However, according to this view, I would be wrong. In 
fact, as long as my parents have the ability to reproduce, I cannot know the answer to 
this question. It simply seems like more intuitive to say that the set gained a member 
when my sister was born. 
 
Options (b) and (c) on the other hand both involve causal changes. If we accept (b) as 
the desired view, we would have the set of my sister(s) changing from the null-set to a 
one-member set when my sister was born. This is a causal story.
47
 If we accept option 
(c) instead, we would be claiming that the set of my sister(s) did not exist before 
1994, but that changed since then. In essence we would be proposing sets coming into 
existence and hence adopting a creationist model of sets. Much like the creationist 
theory of fictional characters, this would be considered a case of causation. 
 
Sets are abstract according to the way of example. Whether or not they will be 
classified as such with the ways of negation and ostension depend on your theory of 
sets. Sets under a mereological model would be defined as concrete, whereas they 
would be abstract with other models. Things are more complicated with the way of 
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abstraction. Do all members of a set share the right forms of equivalence relations? 
Perhaps, but the answer is not clear. 
 
 
1.3.4. Tropes 
 
 
Tropes are properties, but unlike universals, they are abstract particulars. Examples of 
tropes are the particular colour of my car, Barrack Obama’s charisma and the shape of 
my football. These should be compared to non-particular abstract entities such as 
redness, charisma and circularity in general.
48
 The concept of tropes originated from 
D.C. Williams in two papers from 1953. Rather than making a sharp distinction 
between the abstract and the concrete, he argues that concrete objects can be parts of 
tropes.
49
 The particular redness of my car for example at least partially consists of my 
actual car, although we may not want to say that the concrete objects are the only 
components of tropes. Since these concrete parts exist within space/time, we can say 
that tropes at least partially exist within space/time. In On the Elements of Being: II, 
Williams explicitly states that tropes are part of the causal order.   
 
“[The] actual strength of a girder is what holds the bridge up; the heat of 
an atomic explosion scorches a city; and in fact, as we have observed, all 
of the efficacies we know are of abstracta on abstracta” (Williams, 1953b, 
p.184). 
 
The redness of the car makes me buy it; the shape of the football caused it to bounce a 
certain way, Obama’s charisma got him elected. Williams happily assigns these 
causal roles to tropes. This efficacious nature has some intuitive appeal. If these 
entities exist, these causal stories all seem reasonable, at least in everyday language. 
Williams’ tropes are therefore examples of abstract objects that are compatible with 
AOCO. 
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Are tropes really abstract? This is a difficult question to answer. Tropes aren’t 
paradigmatically abstract, so they are concrete under the way of example. The way of 
negation would classify tropes as concrete, as they all exist within space/time. 
However, it is not as clear with the other ways. Different tropes will be categorised 
differently. For example, specific colours and shapes would have to be concrete under 
the way of abstraction because these singular tropes cannot hold between multiple 
concrete objects. However, what about the specific influence of Microsoft? Surely 
this is a trope that holds in more than one singular place and time. Therefore colour 
tropes will be concrete under the way of abstraction, but Microsoft’s influence as an 
entity for example will be abstract. The way of abstraction isn’t alone in its piecemeal 
categorisations of tropes; the way of ostension is the same. It is reasonable to claim 
that we can point to the redness of a car or the specific shape of a ball, so these tropes 
will be concrete here. Microsoft’s influence however certainly cannot just be picked 
out ostensively and must be picked out through a functional expression (eg. the 
influence of Microsoft in American economics). With the way of conflation, we have 
already discussed whether tropes can be reduced to universals. It is more reasonable 
to say that universals are reducible to tropes, rather than other way round. It is likely 
then that tropes will be concrete according to the way of conflation. Nevertheless, we 
can still say that some tropes are abstract according to the ways of abstraction and 
negation. Furthermore, Williams claimed that concreta may not be the only building 
blocks of tropes. If there are non-concrete building blocks, surely these elements 
would be abstract. Despite the philosophical tradition, we have reasons to believe that 
at least some tropes can be considered abstract under certain well known definitions. 
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1.4. Opening the Floodgates 
 
 
We hence already have many cases of causal abstract objects under the different listed 
definitions of being abstract. Therefore, regardless of how we define the term, one has 
to acknowledge the presence of these proposed cases. The listed examples are all 
cases in which concrete events can cause changes within abstract objects. There are 
already decent examples of abstract objects being part of the causal order. One may 
argue that these examples are not enough; what we are really interested in is whether 
or not abstract objects can cause changes themselves. Well, given that they are 
already in the causal sphere, why not? Is there really any reason why this causal arrow 
should only point one way? I will argue for abstract entities being part of causes in the 
next chapter. Adopting AOCO solves many problems. For example, it allows us to 
explain phenomena using abstract objects. Statements such as ‘his pride lead to his 
demise’ and ‘that word made the poem smoother’ are perfectly sensible ones, but we 
cannot make sense of them literally without causal, abstract entities. The advantages 
are not just linguistic; we often do believe that properties for example are responsible 
for changes in our world. For example, we may believe that greed is the chief 
motivator of capitalism. Furthermore, AOCO solves an important epistemic issue 
raised by Benacerraf. This will be discussed in depth in chapter 2. In conclusion, 
abstract objects are already postulated as consequences of causal phenomena, 
allowing abstract objects causal powers solves many problems, and finally there isn’t 
any reason why we shouldn’t allow abstract objects these causal powers given that 
they are already in the causal sphere. I will argue for abstract objects being causes of 
knowledge in the next chapter. For now, we should accept that abstract objects can be 
part of causal effects. 
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2 - Epistemology 
 
 
2.1 The Benacerraf Argument 
 
 
Abstract objects can be causes of knowledge. This has some intuitive value. For 
example, I know I have to buy 5m of tin for my triangular roof because of 
Pythagoras’ theorem. This however has not been the view philosophers have 
historically chosen. I will show why we should not accept this claim and why we 
should accept that abstract objects can cause knowledge. This will then naturally be 
motivation for us to accept AOCO – the thesis that abstract objects are part of the 
causal order. 
 
A very popular argument made against realists originated from Benacerraf, on the 
topic of mathematical entities. Mathematical entities were normally taken to be 
abstract entities taken in the traditional sense – objects which lack spatiotemporal 
properties and hence acausal. Benecerraf then asked if these objects contain no causal 
powers, how can we know anything about them? Surely, if we know about anything 
about the number 3 (taken as an abstract entity), there must be a causal relationship 
between us and that number. In his own words, 
 
“If, for example, numbers are the kinds of entities they are normally taken to 
be, then the connection between the truth conditions for the statements of 
number theory and any relevant events connected with the people who are 
supposed to have mathematical knowledge cannot be made out” 
(Benacerraf, 1973, p.673). 
 
This argument has been extended beyond just mathematical entities and is now used 
to argue against the existence of abstract objects in general. If abstract entities are 
acausal and knowledge requires a causal link between ourselves and the object, how 
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could we have any knowledge of abstract objects? The argument can be summarised 
as follows: 
 
1) We can only know about things that are in the causal order. 
2) Abstract objects are not part of the causal order. 
3) Therefore, we can’t know anything about abstract objects. 
 
Other philosophers have noted the strength of Benacerraf’s objection, including 
Cresswell (2010), Chihara (1990), Liggins (2006), Maddy (1981), Bigelow (1988) 
and many more. In fact, it would be no stretch to say that Benacerraf’s objection has 
become the most prominent argument against realism about abstract objects.  
 
My main claim in this chapter is (i) that once we accept AOCO, we have an easy 
solution to Benacerraf’s problem and (ii) that other purported answers to Benacerraf 
are inadequate. I will first elaborate on why we should not accept Benacerraf's 
conclusion. In 2.3, I will explore the option of denying (1) and adopting another 
causal theory. I will argue that we should keep the causal theory but adjust it slightly. 
I will also discuss Steiner’s objection to the causal theory of knowledge. Furthermore, 
there are certain solutions to Benacerraf’s problem which require us to deny or 
seriously amend the causal theory of knowledge. These theories are positive answers 
to Benacerraf in the sense that they try and show how we can have non-causal cases 
of abstract knowledge. I will discuss these in 2.3. 2.4 will be devoted to whether or 
not the argument is valid – an option that Max Cresswell explores but one that we 
should not accept. Finally I conclude that the best option against Benacerraf is to 
object to (2) and accept AOCO. 
 
 
2.2 The Spurious Conclusion of the Benacerraf Argument 
 
 
There are at least two problems to Benacerraf's conclusion that we cannot know about 
abstract objects:  
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1. It is counter-intuitive and clashes with propositions/theories we believe 
to be true. 
 
David Lewis for example has argued that we cannot accept this conclusion when it 
comes to mathematical entities. If anything, we know a lot more about mathematics 
than we do about epistemology.
50
 Surely, it is hubris to make great changes to the 
current formulations of mathematics just because they are based on abstract objects. 
This reasoning can be extended to cover other abstract objects. Take properties, I 
know that my plastic cup shares a property with my shirt – the property of being blue 
(or at least, I seem to know). I also know that Harry Potter is a fictional character and 
that J.K. Rowling is not. Having to sacrifice these knowledge claims does not seem 
attractive. Notice that none of these abstract truths would seem like controversial 
statements of knowledge outside the philosophy classroom, so they have intuitive 
value.  
 
One may object with the following argument: these are not cases of abstract 
knowledge; they are simply if-then-ist statements. If abstract objects exist then these 
statements would be true, but that does not mean we know anything about abstract 
objects. This argument seems powerful, but should we be convinced by it? 
Phenomenologically, it certainly does not feel like we’re making if-then-ist 
statements. Imagine if we asked some mathematicians whether 2 plus 2 equals 4 and 
they all say yes. Then we ask them, ‘do you just mean that 2 plus 2 equals 4, or that if 
numbers exist then 2 plus 2 would equal 4?’. How would the mathematicians 
respond? They would certainly all be confused. We don’t seem to be making if-then-
ist propositions at all; the assertions are not hypothetical. It certainly seems like a 
reach for us to label these abstract statements if-then-ist. If a) we are stating facts and 
b) these facts seem to involve abstract objects, then surely it is reasonable to say that 
we have abstract knowledge. 
 
2. Denying that we have abstract knowledge gives the abstract realist an 
unnecessary disadvantage. 
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 Lewis, 1986a, p.108-9. 
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This point is perhaps less important than the previous one but it is still worth stating. 
Imagine that you were approaching these ontological debates for the very first time 
and you wanted to weigh up the pros and cons (without bias) of being an abstract 
realist, what advantages would abstract objects give you? Well, once again, it seems 
to be an intuitive and simpler position. When I say that ‘I know 2 plus 2 equals 4’, it 
seems like I am quantifying over abstract entities. If mathematical entities exist, this is 
literally true. On the other hand, if nominalism is true, we would need to repackage all 
our mathematical knowledge, much like Hartry Field did.
51
 Abstract realism allows 
for abstract knowledge, which gives us a more intuitive account of these cases. 
However if Benacerraf is correct, abstract realism loses this advantage. Realism 
would in fact be in worse shape for bloating our ontology without giving us any form 
of epistemic advantage. We cannot simply ignore Benacerraf’s argument, but perhaps 
there is a way around it. If Benacerraf is wrong and abstract knowledge is plausible, 
this would completely change our ontological debates. 
 
 
2.3 Deny the First Premise 
 
 
One option the realist has against Benacerraf is to deny the causal condition of 
knowledge. Recall that Benacerraf’s problem only arises because abstract objects do 
not meet the criteria required by the causal theory, therefore if we reject premise 1, 
the problem fades. However, there are problems with this. I will show the historical 
reasons for postulating such a condition as well as why alternative theories of 
knowledge cannot answer these questions adequately. There are other reasons for 
objecting to the causal theory of knowledge, ones that do not give alternative theories 
themselves. These objections will equally be dealt with. 
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2.3.1.a. The Causal Theory of Knowledge and Gettier Problems 
 
 
The traditional theory of claims that there are three necessary conditions for 
knowledge – justification, truth and belief. Together, these conditions are sufficient. 
This theory has been embraced for a long time until Edmund Gettier raised some 
famous objections to it. The argument is simple; there are cases where something is a 
justified, true, belief without it being a case of knowledge. For example, Smith and 
Jones are two men being interviewed for the same job. Smith has strong reasons to 
believe that Jones will get hired (the owner of the company told him so). Furthermore, 
he knows that there are ten coins in Jones’ pocket. Together, he forms the belief that 
the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. However, assume that Smith 
was mistaken and he got the job instead. As a matter of chance, Smith also has ten 
coins in his pocket; this means that he has a true belief that the man who gets the job 
has ten coins in his pocket. This is a justified true belief, yet we wouldn’t to say that 
Smith knew it. Therefore we should amend or reject the JTB account (Gettier, 1963).   
 
The reason Gettier cases work in the JTB account is that the connection between the 
knowledge and the belief is not strong enough. In other words, the reasons Smith 
believed what he did were different from the reasons that made it true. Smith’s belief 
was true, but it was just a coincidence. Whatever amendment we make to our theory 
of knowledge, it would need a strong link between belief and truth.  
 
The causal condition would obviously provide us with such a link. One could explain 
Smith’s case by the fact that there was no causal link between Smith’s belief and the 
facts. Let ‘S’ be someone who is capable of knowledge, let ‘p’ be a proposition, let 
‘[p]’ be the fact that p, and finally, let ‘Bp’ be S’s belief that p. Put more formally, the 
causal theory of knowledge states that 
 
(CT) S knows that p if and only if Bp was caused by [p]. 
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There are many objections to the casual theory, but I believe they can all be 
overcome. In particular, we will discuss the issue of extended causal connections and 
the problem of inductive knowledge. 
 
There are various counterexamples to the causal theory of knowledge. For example, 
I’m sitting at home and I hear the rain falling. Whenever it rains, the roads become 
wet and whenever that happens, there are an increased number of accidents on the 
freeway. Since I know this from hearing the rain fall, I come to believe that there will 
be more accidents on the freeway. Note that my belief that there will be more 
accidents on the freeway was not directly caused by the fact that there will be more 
accidents on the freeway. The causal theory of knowledge needs to be able to account 
for these extended and complicated causal stories. Furthermore, there’s the problem 
of logical consequences. In 1871, Mendeleev released the first periodic table. He 
noted that there were gaps and hence postulated the existence of elements that were 
not yet discovered. Germanium is such an example. Despite never having any causal 
interactions with this element, Mendeleev knew many facts about it such as its 
melting point, atomic mass, oxide activity etc.
52
 The problem of logical consequences 
also appears in cases of a priori knowledge. I may come to know a priori, without 
any a posteriori aids, that all triangles have three sides. How can this be? The fact that 
all triangles have three sides is supposedly acausal, so the fact that p could not have 
caused the belief that p. Therefore we have many counterexamples to the causal 
theory of knowledge. Any respectable theory of knowledge should account for such 
cases. 
 
Colin Cheyne acknowledges these problems and hence suggests that we should 
amend the causal condition. He has very specific types of causal connections in mind 
and calls these ‘k-causal connections’.  
 
Let ‘q’ and ‘r’ be other propositions, let ‘[q]’ be the fact that q, let ‘[r]’ be the fact that 
r, let Bq be S’s belief that q, and finally let Br be S’s belief that r. [p] is k-causally 
connected to Bp iff either:  
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a) [p] is a cause of Bp, or 
b) [p] and Bp has a common cause, or 
c) there is some [q] such that [p] is a logical consequence of [q], and [q] is the 
cause for Bp, or 
d) there is some [q] such that [p] is a logical consequence of [q], and [q] and Bp 
have a common cause, or 
e) there is some [q] and [r] such that [q] and [r] are k-causally connected to Bq 
and Br, respectably, and [p] is a logical consequence of [q&r].
53
 
 
We can hence adjust the causal theory to accommodate different types of knowledge. 
Using condition (b), we can explain the rain example. Imagine a branching causal 
chain. First of all, the fact that it is raining caused my belief that it is raining, then that 
caused my belief that the roads are wet, which finally caused my belief that there will 
be more accidents. At the same time, the fact that it is raining caused the fact that the 
roads are wet, which caused there to be more accidents. Therefore, there was 
ultimately one common cause between the fact that there are more accidents on the 
road and my belief of it. The germanium and triangle cases can be explained by (c). 
We will start with the former. There are some general rules of atomic structure. The 
fact that these rules exist caused Mendeleev to believe that they exist. This then 
caused his belief that germanium has certain properties. At the same time, the fact 
there are these general atomic rules has the logical consequence of germanium 
following these rules and hence having certain properties. By (c), this story is a k-
causal one. The triangle case is simpler. This is a standard definition of triangles: a 
shape that has three connected and straight sides. From this definition, we come to 
believe that all triangles have three sides. From the definition of a triangle, there is 
also a logical consequence that says that all triangles have three sides. Therefore we 
can also explain away this counterexample to (CT) with condition (c) of the k-causal 
theory. Given that we can deal with these counterexamples by adopting the k-causal 
theory, I propose adopting it rather than dropping the causal theory of knowledge 
altogether. 
 
(KTK) S knows that p iff Bp was k-causally connected to [p]. 
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 Cheyne, 2001, p.67 
38 
 
 
K-causation may adequately explain our intuitions about causation, but are there 
better options? Of course the causal theory of knowledge is only one way of 
answering the Gettier problems. I will now go through the alternative theories, 
seeking both necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge. I will test to see 
whether these theories could answer the same questions better.  
 
We will start with different variants of reliabilism. Reliabilist theories are externalist 
in nature. As long as the epistemic justifications are reliable in obtaining knowledge, 
the reliabilist does not demand any form of internal justification from the knower. 
That is, as long as the methods in obtaining knowledge are reliable, the subject could 
have no idea how he/she came to have this knowledge, yet it would be justified. For 
example, a psychic has random and accurate visions about future (which she 
believes). She has absolutely no clue how this clairvoyant process works, but 
according to the reliabilist, this is sufficient to be called knowledge. The causal theory 
of knowledge is one type of reliabilism, though not all reliabilists demand a causal 
condition. 
 
 
2.3.1.b. Reliabilism - Truth Tracking Theory 
 
 
According to the truth tracking theory, one’s belief that p and the fact that p has the 
same truth conditions. In worlds where p is true, one believes that p; and in worlds 
where p is false, one does not believe that p. For a belief to be counted as knowledge, 
one cannot have that belief without that belief being true. More formally, 
 
Let ‘S’ be someone who is capable of knowledge, and let ‘p’ be a proposition. 
 
(TTT) S knows that p if and only if S believes that p and in the closest possible 
worlds where p is true, S believes that p; and in the closest possible worlds where p is 
false, S does not believe that p. 
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Robert Nozick describes it as follows: 
 
“To know is to have the belief that tracks the truth. Knowledge is a 
particular way of being connected to the world, having a specific real factual 
connection to the world: tracking it” (Nozick, 1981, p.178). 
 
 
Unlike the old JTB account, TTT has a better time dealing with Gettier cases. Take 
the Smith and Jones case, would Smith still believe that the man who gets the job has 
ten coins in his pocket (call this proposition p) if it wasn’t true? The closest possible 
world in which p is not true is one where Smith does not have ten coins in his pocket. 
In this world, Smith still has the false belief that p. Therefore according to TTT, the 
Gettier cases do not qualify as knowledge. 
 
Note that TTT is very similar to the causal theory of knowledge. In fact, if we 
compare it with a counterfactual theory of causation, especially one that involves 
possible worlds, the two theories are almost exactly the same. According to a 
counterfactual theory of causation for, event p causes event q iff p and q both occur, 
and had p not occurred, q would not have occurred either.
54
 Now take just about any 
true proposition that someone believes in, if it qualifies as knowledge under TTT, it 
would qualify as causation under Lewis’ definition as well! 
 
However, one does not have to adopt a counterfactual theory of causation, in which 
case, TTT does not necessarily describe a causal process. This leads to a subtle 
difference between TTT and a causal theory of knowledge – the causal theory 
requires the connection between truth and knowledge to be a causal one, whereas TTT 
doesn’t. Imagine a non-causal process that links the fact that p to the belief that p – 
the clairvoyant story will suffice. The clairvoyant has a non-causal process that allows 
her to track the truth. Let us say that when she receives visions of a murder, a murder 
always happens in her town and when she does not receive a vision, no murders take 
place. According to the causal theory of knowledge, the clairvoyant would not know 
that murders were or were not taking place, whereas with TTT, it would.  
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What are the advantages that TTT has over the causal theory? It seems as though the 
only cases where TTT is preferable are ones which involve some sort of non-causal 
process that suffices for knowledge. Importantly, TTT employs a counterfactual 
framework without it being classified as causation. That means we can explain 
mathematical truths (for example) using abstract objects but without employing 
AOCO!
55
 However, there are challenges for the truth tracking theorist. They need to 
a) explain what these non-causal processes are and b) defend a theory of causation 
other than the counterfactual theory, such that whatever is described under TTT isn’t 
necessarily causal. There are very good reasons to accept the counterfactual theory 
over rival theories; this debate will be discussed in depth in chapter 3. Regardless, a 
convincing argument for other theories of causation needs to be made Nozick and his 
followers in order for TTT to be an attractive option. 
 
 
2.3.1.c.  Reliabilism - Armstrong’s Theory 
 
 
The next reliabilist theory we shall consider is Armstrong’s reliable indicator account. 
He says that for our beliefs to be considered knowledge, they have to be reliable 
indicators of truth. Armstrong makes an analogy with a thermometer – the 
thermometer can reliably tell us what temperature it is; analogously, our processes 
used in gaining knowledge should also be reliable. More formally, 
 
Let ‘S’ be someone who is capable of knowledge, let ‘p’ be a proposition, and finally, 
let ‘Bp’ be S’s belief that p. 
 
(AT) S knows that p if and only if Bp was brought upon by a law-like connection in 
nature such that whenever S believes that p, then p is true.
56
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There are some important points about Armstrong’s version of reliabilism that needs 
to be covered. First of all, note that being reliable does not entail being infallible. A 
thermometer does not accurately measure the temperature all the time, yet it is 
reliable. Likewise, our methods for obtaining knowledge do not need to be 100% 
accurate; it simply needs to have a high success rate. At this point the reader may 
wonder if there are any important differences between the TTT and Armstrong’s 
theory and whether or not they are really just the same. This is the difference: 
Armstrong’s theory states that there needs to be a specific method or law of nature 
that acts as a reliable bridge between fact and belief whereas TTT does not require 
such a process. For example, imagine a man who through an infinite amount of 
mysterious processes always comes to know next week’s lottery numbers. Sometimes 
the numbers appear to him through an arrangement in his tealeaves, sometimes he 
receives an anonymous letter with all the numbers inside, other times he simply has a 
vision which tells him what all the winning numbers are. According to the TTT, the 
man knows what the winning lottery numbers will be. However according to 
Armstrong, this does not qualify as knowledge since there is not a single reliable 
process that would count as justification. 
 
A problem with this theory is that we then need a definition or some other explication 
of what a reliable process is. Colin Cheyne argues that we should take the 
thermometer analogy further and say that it is a causal connection that makes a 
reliable process.
57
 Armstrong himself has denied that that we should use a causal 
description. By his own words, “[it] is an ontological condition. It is not, however, a 
causal connection” (Armstrong, 1973, p.169). Cheyne is worried about Armstrong’s 
causal scepticism, and rightly so. If these reliable connections are not at least part of a 
causal chain, then what are they?  Much like TTT, this leaves Armstrong’s account 
with a puzzle he needs to solve. The causal account at least gives us a clearer account 
of what this mysterious process should be. The fact that these are causal cases seem to 
explain why these are reliable cases of knowledge, whereas the reliable indicator 
theory offers no such explanatory advantage. Once again, Armstrong does not believe 
that these reliable processes are causal, so we cannot even use the causal explanation 
within the reliable indicator account.  
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Another problem with Armstrong’s account is that it does not always deal with 
Gettier problems better. Though it can with some cases, the Jones and Smith story for 
example is one that this account struggles with. What process lead Smith to believe 
that the man who will be hired has coins in his pocket? It was the fact that he was told 
Jones will get the job from the interviewer. For the most part, this seems like a pretty 
reliable process for knowledge about an interview. Defenders of Armstrong may 
object, saying that getting false information from an interviewer that is prone to trick 
the interviewees is not a reliable process. This seems desperate. How fine-grained do 
our processes need to be? It seems more reasonable to say that obtaining information 
from an interviewer is a reliable process but not an infallible one. The information 
may be true in most cases, but not all. So called ‘reliable-processes’ naturally invite 
exceptions to the rule and hence can never completely rule out counterexamples. 
Given these problems, we should refrain from adopting this alternative theory as the 
causal condition deals with these problems better. 
 
 
2.3.1.d. Explanatory Theory 
 
 
Alan Goldman
58
 has another theory of knowledge from his book Empirical 
Knowledge (1998). He states that the fact that p must be a prominent reason for the 
belief that p. This is further explained using probabilities and possible worlds.
59
 
Together, we get the following theory of knowledge: 
 
Let ‘S’ be someone who is capable of knowledge, let ‘p’ be a proposition, let ‘[p]’ be 
the fact that p, and finally, let ‘Bp’ be S’s belief that p. 
 
(ET) S knows that p if and only if either [p] makes Bp ‘significantly’ more probable 
or [p] explains Bp. 
 
                                                 
58
 Not to be confused with Alvin Goldman. 
59
 Goldman, 1988, p.25-32 
43 
 
Note that this theory is separate from Armstrong’s. Just because [p] makes Bp 
significantly more probable does not mean that there is a reliable process between the 
two. Let us imagine that the conspiracy theorists were right and aliens have once 
visited the earth, leaving behind only small traces of evidence. It is reasonable to say 
that the fact that the aliens visited made the belief that aliens visited the earth 
significantly more probable. So let p here be the proposition that the aliens visited the 
earth. We would not want to call this a link between [p] and Bp a reliable process, 
since the majority of the population still do not believe that aliens have visited.  
 
How well does the explanatory theory of knowledge stand up to criticism? First of all, 
there is the question of how [p] would make Bp more probable. Can we not explain 
this with causal chains? Goldman insists that this ambiguity is a strength of his theory. 
There are some defining features in all cases of knowledge; however they differ in 
degrees of stringency according to their contexts. “What counts as empirical 
knowledge in a casual conversation might not count in a court of law, in a philosophy 
classroom, or in a physics laboratory” (Goldman, 1988, p.21). Cheyne raises a more 
important worry – precisely what counts as ‘significantly more probable’?60 Take the 
weight of an atom for example. We may know the weight of it, but if it were just a 
little bit heavier, so little that we cannot measure the difference, would the probability 
of our beliefs changing really be that significant? We can take this worry even further: 
Goldman himself raises this example: there is a hospital in which the equipment is 
powered from the public utility, but also has a backup generator. To say that the 
public utility explains the running of the equipment would be insufficient, because in 
counterfactual cases, the backup generator would power the equipment. Therefore, the 
probability of the equipment being able to run is not significantly raised by the public 
utility.
61
 Goldman himself does not see this as a problem because this is an adequate 
account of explanation. A good theory of explanation should show that the equipment 
did not run solely on the public utility. What Goldman does not realise however, is 
that his theory is still not adequate as a theory of knowledge. Take the popular 
example of the father learning that his son is not a murderer.
62
 In this case, the father 
hears about a murder on the radio news. From its contents, he induces and believes 
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that his son cannot be the murderer because of the time the murder took place, where 
it was etc. However, let us assume that the father would have believed that his son 
was innocent regardless of the news. He may believe this because of his fatherly 
instincts coupled with the fact that his son is only 14 (and hence unlikely to be able to 
formulate such a murder). In this case, the fact that the son did not commit the murder 
can only be a partial and inadequate explanation to the father’s belief that his son is 
innocent. However it seems perfectly feasible for us to say that the father knew that 
his son was innocent given the news on the radio. We seem to have a counterexample 
to the explanatory theory of knowledge. Furthermore, can we have explanations and 
raises in probability without any sort of causal chain whatsoever? This is not 
something we should easily accept. Given that we adopt Cheyne’s concept of k-causal 
chains it seems unlikely that we can find cases of a fact either raising the probability 
of a belief or explaining it without using any causal concepts. With the prevalence of 
these worries, we should not embrace this theory over the causal theory of knowledge. 
 
 
2.3.1.e. Internalism - Evidentialism 
 
 
Evidentialism is a very different approach to reliabilism. Reliabilism employs an 
external account of justification, meaning that as long as the belief is brought about by 
a reliable process, it can bring about knowledge. In comparison, the evidentialist has 
an internal account of justification, meaning that any sort of justification involved in 
obtaining knowledge must at least be evident to the knower. Richard Feldman and 
Earl Conee provided one of the first accounts of evidentialism. According to them, 
 
“Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically justified for S 
at t if and only if having D toward p fits the evidence S has at t” (Conee & 
Feldman, 1985, p.15). 
 
Knowledge is one of these doxastic attitudes. 
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Let ‘S’ be someone who is capable of knowledge, let ‘p’ be a proposition, let ‘Bp’ be 
S’s belief that p, and finally let T be the moment in time when S formed her belief 
that p. 
 
We can hence reformulate this account specifically for knowledge as 
 
(EVT) S knows that p if and only if Bp fits with S’s evidence at T and p is true.  
 
For example, if I walk into a room and come to believe that the lights are on, I can 
trace my belief to certain pieces of evidence. I may have noticed that the room is well 
lit and that the light switch is in the ‘on’ position. My belief that the lights are on is 
justified by my evidence and this evidence is crucial to knowledge, according to the 
evidentialists. Since evidentialism is an internalist theory of knowledge, it disagrees 
fundamentally with the reliabilists’ theories when it comes to justification. Imagine 
that a man had a thermometer device unknowingly implanted in his head such that he 
would receive constant beliefs about what temperature it was. If he has no idea how 
these beliefs are formed then he would not have knowledge according to the 
evidentialists, whereas the reliabilists would be happy saying that the man in fact 
knows how hot or cold it is. 
 
However, EVT alone is not enough, because it still has issues with Gettier problems. 
Smith’s evidence lead to the conclusion that the man who will get hired has ten coins 
in his pocket, yet this is not a case of knowledge. The reliabilists hence need a further 
condition that prevents Gettier cases. Conee & Feldman for example argue that there 
can’t be any piece of evidence that S can find at T which would undermine p.63 So let 
‘E’ be a piece of evidence, adding this to EVT gives us: 
 
(EVT*) S knows that p if and only if p is true, Bp fits with S’s evidence at T, and 
there are no E’s available at T that would undermine p. 
 
Internalists often defend their own position (when contrasted with externalist theories 
of knowledge) by trying to raise epistemic questions surrounding externalism. In 
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Laurence Bonjour’s 1980 paper Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge, he 
raises various examples involving a clairvoyant. In one of the stronger cases for 
example he asks us to imagine this clairvoyant coming to believe the fact that the 
president is in New York. This clairvoyant believes that he is a clairvoyant but has no 
reason to. He has on many occasions tried to prove his clairvoyance but has failed 
every time (his powers malfunctioned under those circumstances). Is he justified in 
believing that the president is in New York? Bonjour says not.
64
 Conee and Feldman 
raised other counterexamples in Internalism Defended . Bob and Ray both read in a 
forecast that it is warm today. Bob then walks outside and feels for himself that it is 
indeed warmer today. According to Conee and Feldman, Bob then experienced a 
“mental change which so to speak ‘internalized’ the actual temperature. Ray had just 
the forecast to rely on” (Conee & Feldman, p.236). This is supposed to show that Bob 
is more justified than Ray because of internal processes that externalists don’t 
mention. 
 
The first case highlights a common mistake about objections from internalists; it 
simply muddles two different concepts –  
 
1. how to decide whether an existing belief counts as knowledge and  
2. how to put ourselves in the best position to receive knowledge.  
 
This is a point that Alvin Goldman makes very clear in his 1980 paper The Internalist 
Conception of Justification.
65
 The problem is that the externalist wants to focus on the 
former problem whereas the internalist wants to focus on the latter. In the clairvoyant 
case, the externalists insist that the clairvoyant knows whatever it is that his 
clairvoyant powers allowed him to know, but the internalists object to these types of 
cases with pragmatic objections. How could the clairvoyant justifiably make decisions 
based on his psychic beliefs over rational evidence? How can he say that he knows 
anything at all? They are questions under point 2, but they are not questions of the 
first kind. The internalists’ objections to these cases really don’t have much to do with 
whether or not the psychic has obtained knowledge. Allow me to phrase the usual 
internalist objections in externalist terms.  
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i) “How does the clairvoyant know that he knows?”  
ii) “How would the psychic deal with a piece of knowledge that doesn’t seem 
justified?” 
iii) “What if this new knowledge seems to contradict other things that he 
knows?”… etc. 
 
In other words, we should look at these problems as separate questions to be asked 
after we have established that the psychic does in fact does have knowledge in these 
case. There is no a priori reason to believe that one cannot have knowledge that they 
cannot explain or justify verbally. If we are truly just asking question 1 – “is this a 
case of knowledge?”, then we should only be judging these cases as a neutral 
observer. We should not be asking questions aimed at the believer, because questions 
such as the three above are further epistemic questions separate from whether or not 
something counts as knowledge. 
 
Furthermore, Conee and Feldman’s point can be answered by the externalists. Can we 
not explain Bob’s superior justification in externalist terms? Sure we can, feeling the 
heat for yourself is a more reliable process of telling the temperature than reading 
about it on a forecast. The internalist has no advantage in this example over the 
externalist. In conclusion the internalists really don’t have an advantage over the 
externalist theory of knowledge when it comes to the questions that matter.  
 
 
2.3.1.f. Contextualism 
 
 
One theory of knowledge has been becoming popular in recent years; that theory is 
contextualism. The other theories all have one uniform standard as to what counts as 
knowledge, what counts as knowledge in everyday life should be the same as what 
counts as knowledge in philosophy. Contextualism objects to this. What counts as 
knowledge should be context-dependent. Though it may be wrong for us to make 
claims such as ‘I know I have hands’ in a debate with a sceptic, it seems odd to say 
48 
 
that such a claim would be problematic under normal circumstances. I will begin with 
Dretske’s form of contextualism then compare it with Lewis and Cohen’s. Ultimately, 
contextualism should not replace the causal theory of knowledge. I will explain my 
reasons for this. 
 
It all starts with Dretske’s account. Let ‘S’ be someone who is capable of knowledge, 
let ‘p’ be a proposition, and let ‘q’ be another proposition. There is a widely accepted 
principle in philosophy that states that 
 
If subject S knows that p and that p entails q, then S also knows that q. 
 
Call this the ‘epistemic principle of closure’ or ‘EPC’ for short. Dretske denies EPC.66   
Sceptical arguments often rely on a modus tollens form of EPC. If EPC is correct, that 
logically entails the following: 
 
S knows that p entails q, if S does not know that q, then S does not know that p. 
 
For example, say we are at a zoo, looking at some zebras. Now take the following 
claims: 
 
1) I know that I am looking at some zebras. 
2) If I don’t know whether or not these ‘zebras’ are really just cleverly disguised 
donkeys, then I don’t know that I am looking at some zebras. 
3) I don’t know whether or not these ‘zebras’ are really just cleverly disguised 
donkeys.
67
 
 
This seems like a paradox, the three propositions cannot all be true. The sceptic then 
denies premise 1 and robs us of such a basic knowledge claim. Dretske on the other 
hand denies premise 2, which is actually just EPC applied. His reasoning is that 
epistemic operators such as ‘I know that’, ‘I believe that’ etc. do not penetrate. This 
means that the truth values of the propositions are not necessarily the same before and 
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after the inference.
68
 The operator did not penetrate because we were talking about 
different contexts. Dretske explains that an epistemic alternative will only penetrate if 
the latter context was part of the relevant alternatives of the original situation.
69
  
 
So exactly what are these relevant alternatives? The relevant alternatives could be 
explained as the reasonable ways you could be wrong. When I believe that I am 
watching a zebra in a zoo, maybe what I am looking at is really just a sign involving a 
picture of a zebra. Alternatively, maybe my son is just holding up his toy zebra and I 
just mistook it for a real one. These are all relevant alternatives given the context. 
What is not a relevant alternative is the possibility of a cleverly disguised donkey. The 
chances of this happening are incredibly slim. In everyday normal contexts, we cannot 
consider this as a relevant epistemic possibility.
70
 The context changes if we are in a 
philosophy classroom and not the zoo. Suddenly, sceptical possibilities like the zebra 
being a cleverly disguised horse are relevant. So the standards required for knowledge 
change with context.  
 
Dretske explains what makes an alternative relevant or irrelevant in his 1981 paper 
The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge.  First of all, language can give us hints as to 
which alternatives are relevant.
71
 One’s choice of words is such an example. If I said 
‘your neighbour found your joke funny’ it would seem that I was making a comment 
about how funny your joke was. However if I said ‘a man I didn’t recognise found 
your joke funny’, perhaps I was enquiring about who found your joke funny. Word 
stress can do the same thing. ‘Your neighbour found your joke funny’ has different 
connotations from ‘your neighbour found your joke funny’. In the first instance, the 
relevant alternatives would be your doctor or your wife finding the joke funny for 
example. In the latter, the relevant alternatives would be your joke being lame or only 
mildly amusing. Your choice of words can also show how you came to believe 
something. ‘I heard from my hairdresser that America has started peace talks’ may 
imply that this information came from an unreliable source. If your original belief was 
that America wants to keep the war going, perhaps this is enough to make the 
possibility of peace talks irrelevant.  
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Apart from language, Dretske also talks about how the importance of a belief can 
influence your set of relevant alternatives.
72
 Say you believed that your tap-dancing 
shoes were in the closet. If you were just wondering if you could show off your 
dancing skills to your friends this weekend, the consequences of you being wrong are 
not that severe. Therefore we can have relatively low requirements for knowledge and 
have less relative alternatives. However, if you were preparing for the world tap-
dancing championships tomorrow, the consequences would be much more serious. 
Therefore we should have higher standards of knowledge and have more relevant 
alternatives.  
 
Finally Dretske asks whether an alternative can just be too remote to be relevant. He 
says not, since there are always cases where the seemingly unlikely situation just 
happens to be the truth. Having evidence for a belief being a possible alternative is not 
a necessary condition for being a relevant alternative, but it may be sufficient.
73
 
Importantly, Dretske concludes that what qualifies as a relevant alternative should not 
be dictated by what one regards as such, instead, it should be something within the 
objective reality.
74
  
 
So concludes the first Dretske’s formulation of contextualism. This account has been 
influential. Philosophers such as David Lewis, Stewart Cohen and Keith DeRose have 
all contributed to contextualism afterwards. However, Dretske’s form of 
contextualism has also been challenged by precisely these philosophers for different 
reasons.  
 
Recall that Dretske’s answer to the sceptic’s paradox was to deny EPC. Denying the 
closure principle is not a popular solution amongst many philosophers. Stewart Cohen 
notes that the contextualist can respond to the paradox without denying EPC.
75
 Here is 
the paradox again: 
 
1) I know that I am looking at some zebras. 
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2) If I don’t know whether or not these ‘zebras’ are really just cleverly disguised 
donkeys, then I don’t know that I am looking at some zebras. 
3) I don’t know whether or not these ‘zebras’ are really just cleverly disguised 
donkeys. 
 
By definition, the contextualist believes that standards of knowledge changes with 
context. Now let’s ask ourselves, are the standards of knowledge the same for 1 and 
3? They’re not. In 1, we are talking in a casual, everyday sense, and hence have low 
standards for knowledge. In 3, we are approaching sceptical problems as 
philosophers, so obviously our standards for knowledge would be higher. We can 
hence object to different propositions in different contexts. In normal situations, we 
will reject 3, whereas when we are doing epistemology, we will reject 1. Either way 
the closure principle is not threatened. 
 
A bigger disagreement between Dretske and other philosophers is what governs the 
relevancy of an alternative. Before we go into these rules, it’s important to note that 
according to Lewis’ contextualism, S knows that p iff p fits all the possibilities not 
eliminated by S’s evidence.76 This has certain implications on the importance of the 
rules dictating which alternatives are relevant. Here are Lewis’ conditions for 
relevancy: 
 
1. Actuality 
 
What actually happens can never be an irrelevant alternative. If S knows that p then p 
is true. This is not controversial.
77
 
 
2. Belief 
 
This is another condition that fits well with the old JTB account. Whatever S believes 
will be a relevant alternative.
78
 Note that this is different with Dretske’s account. 
Dretske claimed that there is an objective truth as to what counts as a relevant 
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alternative, so S believing that p should not be a necessary condition for p being 
relevant, according to him.  
 
3. Resemblance 
 
If an alternative q saliently resembles a relevant one r, then q is relevant too. Any 
alternative that saliently resembles actuality in terms of the evidence pointing towards 
it is also relevant. This is an important rule, since it is what (apparently) gets Lewis’ 
contextualism out of Gettier problems. Take the Smith case again, what were the 
relevant alternatives? One relevant alternative was that the employer was lying 
coupled with the possibility that Smith did not have ten coins in his pocket. This is an 
alternative that saliently resembles his original belief, so it is relevant. However in 
this possibility, p (that the man who gets the job has ten coins in his pocket) does not 
hold. Therefore by Lewis’ definition, Smith did not have genuine knowledge.79 
 
4. Reliability 
 
Certain processes such as perception, personal testimony and memory are generally 
reliable processes. Therefore in general, they should play a role in an alternative’s 
relevancy (eg. if I remember reading that the zookeeper likes to disguise horses as 
zebras, the possibility of the ‘zebra’ being a horse should be a relevant alternative).80 
 
5. Representation & Explanation81 
 
These are two rules that Lewis only talks about briefly. We should believe that our 
samples are representational and our inferences to the best explanation are true. There 
are bound to be problems with these rules, the most logical explanation may not be 
true; the truth may seem random to us. There are more important rules however that 
have drawn more attention. 
 
6. Conservatism 
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There are certain possibilities that are ignored because of society’s conventions. 
Having a donkey disguised as a zebra for example, no matter how much it resembles 
actuality, just seems implausible, so we ignore it. We are allowed to ignore these 
types of alternatives.
82
 
 
7. Attention 
 
According to Lewis, the relevant worlds are a subject to our conversational contexts.
83
 
For example, say we are discussing whether or not we knew that we were looking at a 
zebra. We start by chatting conversationally. At this point, we are using a normal, 
everyday conception of knowledge, so possibilities such as the zebra really being a 
donkey are not relevant. Suddenly, a philosopher joins us and starts making sceptical 
arguments. Suddenly, cleverly disguised donkeys become relevant alternatives.  
 
The rule of attention is a controversial one. Richard Feldman (1999) has objected to 
this with a counterexample. Take any normal knowledge claim eg. that I have hands, 
when we become convinced by sceptical arguments, we now think that we don’t 
know such things at all. Furthermore, when we look back to moments before we 
became sceptics, we don’t think that we were right in both occasions. Rather, we 
think we were wrong before and now we are right.
84
 Therefore, it really does not seem 
like we shifted contexts at all. Rather, one belief simply replaced another. Cohen 
agrees with Lewis on the rule of attention and objects with Feldman. His has two 
arguments. First of all contextualism can be construed as a type of error theory. It may 
not seem to us that we were crossing contexts, but according to the contextualists, we 
really were. Furthermore, we could take the contextualist claim as a normative rather 
than a descriptive one. We may not be crossing epistemic contexts when we switch 
from our everyday conversations to sceptical debates; but perhaps we should.
85
 
Feldman’s phenomenological arguments can hence be answered. 
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There are more pressing problems for contextualism – Gettier problems to be precise. 
David Lewis has argued that the rule of resemblance along with his definition of 
knowledge can together rule out Gettier problems. This is not the case and Cohen 
(2006) has an argument for it. Cohen of course is a contextualist himself, but he, like 
most contextualists, doesn’t claim that he can solve the Gettier problems. In his 2006 
paper titled Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Skepticism, Gettier, 
and the Lottery, he raises an objection to Lewis. Recall that the rule of resemblance 
requires the resemblance to be salient, but that, according to Cohen is what gives 
Lewis’ account troubles. He asks us to imagine a special type of Gettier case: subject 
S is looking at a hill and he thinks he sees a sheep. However, that ‘sheep’ is really just 
a rock that looks like a sheep from a distance. Additionally, just out of pure luck, 
there is a sheep right behind the rock. Does S know that there is a sheep on the hill? 
No he does not. Lewis would say that his account can deal with this case because the 
possibility of the ‘sheep’ being a rock, and a sheep being behind that rock resembles 
S’s belief. Therefore it is a relevant alternative that cannot be ignored. So far so good. 
Here’s the trick, another person, call him ‘A’, is standing right next to S. A is 
wondering whether or not S knows that there is a sheep on the hill. Furthermore, A is 
not aware that S only sees a sheep-shaped rock, so the possibility that S is in a Gettier 
situation is not salient to him. Therefore, A can say that S knows that there’s a sheep 
on the hill.
86
 The contextualist therefore cannot deal with certain Gettier problems. 
 
Ultimately, the truth of contextualism does not necessitate the falsity of the causal 
theory. Let’s assume that the contextualists are right and we adopt the claim that 
standards of knowledge are context dependent. What then? What counts as 
justification (or some equivalent to it) according to this account? If we look past 
Lewis’ relevant alternatives semantics, what we have is essentially an evidentialist 
account. However as we have seen, evidentialist accounts have no advantage over 
causal accounts. Can we not still apply causal notions to contextualism? Yes we can. 
Perhaps different contexts calls for different standards of knowledge, but these 
standards can all involve causal concepts. Given that a) the objections to the causal 
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theory could be solved and that b) its competitors have even greater problems, the 
causal theory remains our best theory of knowledge.
87
 
 
 
2.3.2. Steiner’s Objection 
 
 
In response to Benacerraf’s problem, Steiner chooses to object to the first premise and 
the causal theory of knowledge. Unlike the philosophers considered in the previous 
section who give an alternative theory of knowledge, Steiner objects on the grounds 
that there isn’t a reasonable formulation of the causal theory that doesn’t make any 
reference to causal abstract objects. He goes through different formulations of the 
causal theory and eventually settles with his conclusion. My objection to Steiner is 
that he made a crucial mistake in his second attempt at formulating the causal theory. 
I will go through all the formulations he considers. Of course, I have no problems 
with accepting a causal theory of knowledge that involves causal abstracta, but we 
don’t need to make such a point against Steiner. For all of Steiner’s attempts, let ‘S’ 
be someone who is capable of knowledge, let ‘p’ be a proposition, let ‘[p]’ be the fact 
that p, and finally let ‘χ’ be a sentence. 
(1) S cannot know that p unless [p] causes one’s belief that p. 
This makes references to facts, which are abstract objects.
88
 For a fact to cause 
knowledge is hence to postulate a causal abstract object. Steiner therefore tries to 
formulate the causal theory without making references to abstract entities: 
(2) S cannot know that χ is true, unless χ must be used in causal explanation that χ 
is true. 
The problem with this formulation is that in its current form, it cannot undermine the 
force of mathematics with reference to abstract objects. Let p be the proposition that 
the axioms of number theory and or analysis are true; given that we believe that they 
are true, Steiner argues that there must be a theory that causally explains why we 
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believe these axioms to be true. This theory will inevitably involve the axioms. We 
would then have a case where the axioms are used to causally explain their own truth. 
2 is met and so we cannot object to mathematical Platonism through this version of 
the causal theory of knowledge.
89
 Perhaps what we need is then a version that makes 
no references to causal explanations: 
(3) S cannot know anything involving F unless one’s beliefs about F were caused 
by F (or F’s). 
Steiner notes that this formulation is problematic because it has objects as its causal 
relata. This is unusual, we tend to think of causal relata as events.
91
 So we need to 
reformulate the causal theory as 
(4) S cannot know anything involving F unless one’s beliefs about F were caused 
by an event (or events) which F (or F’s) participate(s) in. 
The problem with this formulation is that we can have everyday cases of knowledge 
that do not meet this requirement. Steiner’s example is one involving extinct species. 
Let’s say a now extinct mammal created a footprint in the jungle. Many years later, 
the zoologists discovered this footprint and came to know many things about this 
animal because of it. Here we have knowledge about F’s but the latter events don’t 
actually involve F’s.92 Steiner states that this is an example of an event causing a 
condition and that condition being partly responsible for another event, which in turn 
caused something else.
93
 Our problem stems from the fact that the story is put in terms 
of conditions. Talk about conditions causing is talk about causal explanation, but if 
we wanted to translate this back to talk about causal explanations, we end up with the 
same structure as (2). This is problematic. This is where Steiner concludes that a 
nominalist construal of the causal theory is impossible. 
 
Steiner makes a mistake in arguing against version 2. 2 does not specify what it means 
to be ‘used in a causal explanation’. Any theory that involves the mathematical 
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axioms for example may use its truth to infer certain things, but what it does not do is 
show the axiom itself interacting with us causally. Surely, it is the latter of causation 
that we are interested in; that is the crux of Benacerraf’s epistemic problem.94 As long 
as the causal theorist provides us with a version of the causal account that specifies 
this type of causal interaction, they can avoid Steiner’s objection. We will add this 
condition to KTK. 
 
Let ‘p’ be a propositions let ‘[p]’ be the fact that p, let Bp be S’s belief that p, and 
finally let Op be all the objects involved in p (identified through the Quinean method). 
 
(KTK#) S knows that p iff Bp was k-causally connected to [p], and that all the 
components of Op are capable of causally interacting with us.  
 
Of course, we could also just choose to adopt (1) or (2). AOCO theorists such as 
myself have no problem accepting a theory like that. Either way, Steiner’s objections 
therefore do not pose any real threat to the causal theory of knowledge. 
 
 
2.3.3 Objections with Positive Solutions 
 
 
We have examined alternative accounts to the causal theory of knowledge. Other 
philosophers such as Wright, Zalta, Linsky and Balaguer deny the traditional causal 
theory without proposing other theories of knowledge. Instead, they give positive 
accounts, showing precisely how we can come to know about acausal abstract objects. 
These accounts are very impressive, but ultimately are not accounts we should adopt. 
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2.3.3.a. Wright’s Solution 
 
 
Crispin Wright actually gives us a way of learning about abstract objects without 
needing them to be efficacious. Wright objects to the causal theory of knowledge, or 
at least, he objects to the standard formulations of the theory of knowledge. For the 
causal theory to accommodate his solution to Benacerraf, substantial changes need to 
be made. Recall that the standard theory of knowledge requires the subject to causally 
interact with the object of his knowledge. Wright suggests weakening this condition. 
He claims that for example, it may be enough for us to interact with the causally 
necessary states of affairs sufficient to the proposition in question.
95
 
 
Wright’s solution once again makes use of equivalence relations. Recall that Wright 
himself wants to define abstract objects as equivalence relations, so this is no surprise. 
This is his epistemic solution: we can know about abstract objects by interacting with 
the concrete components that the entity is equivalent with. Wright gives a famous 
example involving the universal of having a certain direction. Two lines, X and Y, 
pointing to the same direction is logically equivalent to X and Y being parallel. With 
this in mind, imagine someone who has mastered the use of sentences involving 
directions and parallel lines. Benacerraf’s problem troubles her – exactly how did she 
come to learn about directions? She then realises that she came to this understanding 
through the relevant equivalence. We can hence learn about abstract entities through 
equivalence relations, gaining knowledge about them through concrete entities which 
partake in these relations.
96
 If Wright is correct, we would then have a way of 
knowing about causal entities without causally interacting with them.  
 
Wright’s argument is one that nominalists don’t like; Hatry Field particularly argues 
in a direct response that the abstract object adds no epistemic value to this story. In 
other words, I could know that two lines are parallel without abstract objects even 
existing.
97
 Field himself uses this point to argue against Wright’s Platonism, which is 
unfortunately out of place within our discussion. Once again, what we want are 
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arguments for or against the knowledge of abstract objects. Questions such as these 
about the properties of abstract entities should precede questions about their existence. 
Perhaps we can adjust Field’s argument for our purposes. Do these equivalence 
relations really give us knowledge about abstract objects at all, or simply of concreta? 
Wright’s solution hence opens the door to as many questions as it could answer. On 
one hand, it seems to allow us to accept theories involving abstracta; on the other 
hand, we’re not even sure if this theory of abstract objects tells us anything about 
abstracta at all. There is also the familiar problem of whether all abstract objects can 
be reduced to equivalence relations. If not, then Wright’s solution can only help us so 
much. 
 
 
2.3.3.b. Full-Blooded and Principled Platonism 
 
 
Mark Balaguer, Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta have also all tried to give realist 
accounts that get around Benacerraf’s problem. Balaguer does this through his theory 
of ‘full-blooded Platonism’. Linsky and Zalta have a similar account with what they 
call ‘principled Platonism’. Both of these accounts try to evade Benacerraf’s problem 
by a) denying the causal theory of knowledge, and b) showing that we can have non-
causal cases of knowledge by postulating a plenitude of abstract objects. Although the 
existing objections to these theories can be solved, I will propose further reasons for 
rejecting FBP and PP. 
 
Balaguer’s FBP is a model that states that “all the mathematical objects which 
possibly could exist actually do exist, or perhaps that there exist mathematical objects 
of all kinds” (Balaguer, 1995, p.304). This model was created to get around 
Benacerraf’s epistemic challenge. From FBP, any mathematical proposition that is 
consistent therefore successfully picks out part of the abstract realm. Unlike Wright, 
Balaguer outright denies the causal theory of knowledge.
98
 His model of realism 
allows us to have knowledge about abstract entities without there being a causal 
connection between ourselves and the object. 
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Note that this view naturally generates an infinite amount of mathematical objects, 
many of which we haven’t even thought of. There may be different sets of natural 
numbers for example because they differ according to different mathematical axioms. 
Whenever we refer to a mathematical object, say the number 1, we will inevitably 
refer to a myriad of different abstract entities that are all the number 1, but with 
slightly different properties. Balaguer does not view this as a problematic 
consequence of his theory.
99
 Furthermore, Balaguer states that if we accept a 
correspondence theory of truth, then any consistent mathematical proposition is true! 
This seems to lead to contradictions, because different mathematical theories may 
contradict each other. Let ‘C’ be a mathematical theory. How can both C and not C be 
true? Balaguer finds this unproblematic. These are different theories referring to 
different regions of the mathematical realm, so there is no real contradiction (Colin 
Cheyne has more to say about this and I shall discuss this later).  
 
Cheyne argues that FBP displays an odd relationship between the numerical terms and 
the objects they are supposed to reference. He makes the distinction between 
intentional and extensional assignments. In extensional assignments, we can (even 
arbitrarily) pick out a group of objects and give them a term. Cheyne uses the example 
of arbitrarily picking certain sheep from a mob and calling them ‘slithy’ sheep. On the 
other hand, an example of intentional assignment would be picking out the merino 
sheep from the mob. In intentional assignments, we already understand the term, and 
that meaning then picks out the set. With extensional assignments, the set picks out 
the meaning of the term. The worry with FBP is that the assignments of number terms 
to abstract objects here seem purely extensional, when Balauger seems to think that 
the assignment should be intentional in the rest of the paper.
102
 Cheyne claims 
furthermore that we would be able to intentionally assign numbers to their numerical 
terms if we knew what it meant to have number-like properties, but we don’t. 
Numbers exist outside of space/time, so their properties are out of reach. He makes an 
analogy to how colour terms would be meaningless if the human race never 
developed sight.
103
 Since we cannot come to contact with number properties, we can’t 
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understand them, and hence, we cannot pick out numbers through intentional 
assignments.   
 
FBP has the tools to answer this challenge. Do we really not know anything about the 
properties of numbers? Take the number 1, we know that it is the smallest positive 
integer; we know that it is half of 2; we know that we can add it to 2 to make 3... it 
seems that we know an awful lot about something we can never know about. The 
reason we know about the properties of numbers is that it is part of a consistent 
system of arithmetic. For our system to be consistent, numbers simply have to be a 
certain way. Given the conditions surrounding the consistency of arithmetic, we come 
to know properties of numbers, even if we have no causal connections with the actual 
entities. Since we can know these things about numbers, we can pick them out 
through intentional assignment. Cheyne’s challenge can be resolved. 
 
Cheyne has another argument which is also based on the worry that we cannot 
distinguish between different mathematical objects. He starts by showing how a 
Platonist like Balaguer may formulate natural-number arithmetic: 
 
“(P1) Zero is a natural number. 
(P2) Every natural number has a successor, which is also a natural 
number. 
(P3) Zero is not the successor of any natural number. 
(P4) Different natural numbers have different successors. 
(P5) [The induction postulate]” (Cheyne, 2001, p.175)”. 
 
Now compare this formulation to an analogous but intentionally ridiculous one that 
Cheyne created: 
 
“(D1) Genie is a djinn. 
(D2) Every djinn has a meta, which is also a djinn. 
(D3) Genie is not the meta of any djinn. 
(D4) Different djinns have different metas. 
(D5) [A suitable induction postulate]” (Cheyne, 2001, p.184). 
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‘Djinn arithmetic’ is equally consistent, as it was created by mirroring the structure of 
its predecessor. According to FBP, djinn arithmetic exists, and according to a 
correspondence theory of knowledge it is true! Of course, this is not a consequence 
we would want to accept. Djinn arithmetic is a ridiculous creation, miles away from 
any respectable formulation of arithmetic. Due to the nature of FBP we get the 
unpleasant consequence of any consistent model being mathematical truth. This is a 
great objection by Cheyne. The FBP-ist needs some sort of clause that avoids these 
senseless models from being vacuously true.  
 
On the other hand, Linsky and Zalta’s principled Platonism has all the advantages of 
FBP but without this problem. PP introduces a new concept that sets it apart from 
other forms of realism – the concept of encoding. Most forms of realism explain the 
properties of an abstract object through the concept of exemplification; PP 
distinguishes between exemplification and encoding. The most important principles 
surrounding the concept of encoding are: 
 
1) Every condition of properties has an abstract object that encodes precisely 
these properties. 
2) If an abstract object encodes a property, it does so necessarily. 
3) Two abstract entities are identical iff they encode the same properties.104 
 
The properties that are encoded in an abstract object are precisely the ones that make 
it unique. For example, the property of redness is encoded in the universal of red. 
What is exemplified in the universal are properties such as existing outside of space 
and time ie. properties that the abstract object has but that plays no part in 
distinguishing itself from other abstract objects of the same type. The first principle 
makes PP a model that postulates an abundance of abstract objects, much like FBP. 
From 1, we can say that for every condition of properties, there is an abstract object 
that exists which encodes those properties.
105
 This allows PP knowledge of abstract 
objects without needing any causal interactions, much like FBP, as any knowledge 
over properties would inevitably be knowledge about abstract objects. Like Balaguer, 
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Linsky and Zalta explicitly deny the causal theory of knowledge, because their 
account shows how abstract knowledge can be acausal.
106
 
 
Cheyne argues that PP gets around the djinn arithmetic challenge because of the 
differences between PP and FBP. Where FBP states that any consistent mathematical 
proposition exists, PP only states that there is an abstract object that encodes every 
condition. This is an important distinction because ‘being the meta of a djinn’ for 
example is a meaningless statement. What would it even mean for an object to have 
this property? How can anything exemplify a meaningless attribute? Therefore, 
despite its consistency, there really isn’t any such property. We therefore do not have 
to worry about any old property being true or playing roles in fields that they are not 
related to
107
 and PP does not have any problems regarding this objection. 
 
Given these strengths of PP, shall we accept it as our solution to Benacerraf’s 
problem? Although this would work with certain abstract objects such as 
mathematical entities, it is less appealing when applied to others. First of all, not all 
abstract objects are properties. Sets, fictional characters and events for example are all 
other types of abstract objects. Even if we assume that these entities can be 
convincingly construed as properties, we still have problems with contingent abstract 
objects. Let us take a creationist view of fictional characters and apply PP to it. Even 
before J.K. Rowling created Harry Potter, the character existed according to PP, 
because there is an abstract object that encodes any property that could exist. This 
seems odd, if Harry Potter always existed then what happens when the author creates 
it? Remember that we are assuming a creationist model here, so it seems incredibly 
odd to say that Harry always existed. Notice that although PP has no problems with 
the djinn arithmetic case, it still struggles with this one. In order for PP to be 
applicable to cases such as fictional characters, we must insist that any abstract object 
that exists must exist as necessary properties. Not only would we have to insist that 
these abstract objects are properties, we would have to give up on all models which 
view any abstract objects as contingent. These are both good reasons for us to reject 
PP since not all abstract objects fit into this mould. These models are really no help to 
the abstract realist. 
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2.4 Deny the Validity of Benacerraf’s Argument 
 
 
Max Cresswell argues against the validity of Benacerraf’s objection. He claims that 
there is a fallacy of equivocation.  
 
“What I will try to show in the present article is that premise (2) relies on an 
equivocation in ‘part of the causal order’” (Cresswell, 2010, p.250). 
 
Benacerraf describes ‘being part of the causal order’ in two different ways. When he 
states that only things which are part of the causal order can lead to knowledge, he is 
talking about general causal interaction. We know about things because we can 
interact with them in certain ways. However, when Benacerraf talks about abstract 
objects being outside of the causal order, he is talking strictly about existence. When 
philosophers say that numbers are outside of the causal order, all they are really 
saying is that it exists necessarily. It is still possible for such objects to interact with 
us causally. Cresswell makes this point using propositions as an example. For 
someone to know something is for person a and proposition p to have some form of 
knowledge relation. Statements of knowledge then come into causal explanations eg. 
‘If I had know that you were coming I’d have baked a cake’.108 The truth of the 
proposition is contingent and can be a subject of interaction within the causal order. 
However, the existence of the proposition is necessary. Traditional realists about 
propositions would say that the proposition has always existed and outside of 
space/time.  
 
“If I cause an accident it is not normally my existence which caused the 
accident – it is something I did, something which is true of me. If so, 
questions about what kind of existence an entity has need not tell us 
anything about what other kinds of things can be true of that entity” 
(Cresswell, 2010, p.252). 
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So truth and existence are separate concepts, the former is contingent and the latter is 
necessary. The truth of a proposition can be part of causal interactions. Although 
Cresswell does not make this point explicitly, it is strongly suggested that abstract 
objects such as propositions are therefore part of the causal order in terms of its 
interactions, but they are not part of the causal order in the sense that they do not 
come in and out of existence. Benacerraf did not realise this distinction. 
 
If Cresswell is right, this is a deathblow to Benacerraf. Benacerraf’s argument should 
really read like this 
 
1#) We can only have knowledge of things that we can interact with causally. 
2#) Abstract objects exist necessarily, they do not come in and out of existence; 
therefore the events of these objects coming into existence are not within the 
causal order. 
3#) Therefore, we cannot have knowledge of abstract objects. 
 
This is obviously invalid. Once we see that Benacerraf’s original argument contained 
the fallacy of equivocation, the premises no longer entails the conclusion. We need a 
further premise such as ‘we cannot causally interact with entities that do not come in 
and out of existence’ for the argument to be structurally valid.  
 
Cresswell states that if Benacerraf’s argument has any force at all, it requires an 
underlying metaphysical premise – what Benacerraf himself calls a PMP or ‘Princess 
Margaret Premise’. For example, Benacerraf may claim that we can analyse 
everything without the aid of abstract objects, so we should not postulate them. 
Alternatively, perhaps we should only postulate the existence of things we can 
perceive. However, Benacerraf needs such an argument and this is not present in his 
epistemic objection; so his argument, as it currently stands, does no real work.
109
  
 
This looks grim for Benacerraf, but perhaps things are not as bad as it looks. Let us 
assume that he disagrees with the objection. It’s not that there is an equivocation on 
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‘being part of the causal order’, it’s that Benacerraf (along with other metaphysicians) 
believe abstract objects are acausal on every front. According to this view, 
propositions cannot partake in causal interactions. This certainly seems to fit with the 
traditional way of viewing abstract objects. According to the defenders of Benacerraf, 
this is what the argument should be like: 
  
1#) We can only have knowledge of things that we can interact with causally. 
2#) Abstract objects both exist necessarily and cannot be interacted with causally. 
3#) Therefore, we cannot have knowledge of abstract objects. 
 
 
Supporters of Cresswell will no doubt object to this, “Isn’t it obvious that the truths of 
propositions are within the causal order?” they would say. Perhaps they’re right, but 
that doesn’t show that there is an equivocation, that shows that abstract objects are 
indeed part of the causal order. I therefore conclude that denying the structure of 
Benacerraf’s problem is not our best solution. 
 
 
2.5. Deny the second premise 
 
 
We have tried different answers to Benacerraf’s epistemic problem but none of them 
seem appealing. Cresswell attacks the validity of the argument, but that can be easily 
avoided. Denying the causal condition also seems like a fruitless endeavour. The 
causal theory of knowledge stands as the strong favourite among theories of its kind 
and its status seems hard to shake. Wright, Linsky and Zalta all offer impressive 
arguments but they all have their shortcomings. 
 
The realist seems to be caught in a compromising position; on the one hand she wants 
to continue postulating the existence of abstract objects for whatever reasons, on the 
other hand, she realises postulating acausal entities would lead to major epistemic 
issues. The realist cannot both have her cake and eat it, which in effect makes anti-
realism a more attractive position, on the face of it. However, this is not the case. 
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There is one option the realist has left. I propose that we should all adopt AOCO. 
Given my proposal, we can accept Benacerraf’s argument without sacrificing the 
existence of abstract entities. The causal model of abstract objects thus arms the 
realist with a simple and effective solution to this epistemic problem.  
 
In chapter 1, I argued that abstract objects are part of causal effects. Now we should 
accept that they can also be part of causes. I propose that abstract objects can do this 
at least in terms of giving us knowledge. We at least have some reasons to allow 
abstract entities into the causal order given that there are philosophers who have 
allowed for their abstract objects to be efficacious.  
 
Just in case the reader is still not convinced I will strengthen my argument by listing 
philosophers who have postulated abstract objects as part of causes. We will start with 
Gödel’s mathematical axioms. Axioms are the building blocks of mathematics. There 
are different axiom theories which philosophers and mathematicians propose. These 
axioms are supposed to provide a base in which all mathematical propositions and 
truths could be derived from. If one fully accepts the first sentence of this paragraph, 
he/she is committed to the existence of axioms through Quine’s methodology (eg. Mx 
where x is an object and Mx = ‘x is a building block of mathematics’). 
 
Kurt Gödel claimed that these axioms not only exist as abstract objects, they can be 
perceived by us through intuition. 
 
“He compares the axioms of logic and mathematics with the laws of nature 
and logical evidence with sense perception, so that the axioms need not 
necessarily be evident in themselves, but rather their justification lies 
(exactly as in physics) in the fact that they make it possible for these “sense 
perceptions” to be deduced; which of course would not exclude that they 
also have a kind of intrinsic plausibility similar to that of physics” (Gödel, 
1951, p.127). 
 
In other words the fact that we have mathematical knowledge means that we should 
have a method in gaining that knowledge. This gives us evidence in believing both the 
existence and the causal nature of mathematical axioms. We come to gain knowledge 
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of these axioms through mathematical intuition. This intuition is best explained 
through a comparison with sensory perception. Both of these faculties provide us with 
“elementary indisputable evidence”.110 This helps explain why many people can have 
diverse opinions on many topics, yet a unified account of mathematics. 
 
Furthermore, John Bigelow in his book The Reality of Numbers (1988) has argued for 
a physicalist conception of numbers. He argues that numbers are universals. 
According to Bigelow, universals are defined as things that can be wholly present in 
multiple places at the same time. The universal of beauty for example is wholly 
present in a flower in New Zealand and the Mona Lisa in the Louvre. Universals have 
a problem with location. So where is the beauty in the Mona Lisa? Is it in the corner? 
Is it in the background perhaps? Despite these problems, Bigelow argues that 
universals nonetheless still have locations – they are located where particulars 
exemplify these properties, but we cannot say much more than that.
111
  
 
Given that numbers are universals thus construed, they by definition have 
spatiotemporal properties. How else could a universal be at different places in the 
same time? Since numbers can exist within space/time, they can be causal in a way 
traditional Platonic numbers cannot. It is this very causal nature of universals and 
numbers which made Bigelow hesitate in calling them ‘abstract’.112 
 
Though Bigelow did not want to call his numbers abstract, we should ask the 
question: why not? Is it only because he sees then as causal entities? A more natural 
option is simply to view these entities as causal abstract objects. Given all the positive 
consequences of AOCO, this certainly has its values. 
 
Let’s not forget about Linda Wetzel’s linguistic types either. It’s not only natural for 
us to be able to be causally influenced by words for example; it is equally natural for 
us to causally influence them. In her own words: 
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“They may be specified one at a time, as when we refer to the word 
‘eleemosynary’, or all at once, as when a linguist specifies the sentences of 
English by means of a set of recursive rules. So there really is no mystery 
about how spatiotemporal creatures like ourselves come to know about these 
abstract linguistic objects, what properties they have, and so on” (Wetzel, 
2009, p.123). 
 
In conclusion we should accept that abstract objects are part of the causal order, as 
parts of both causes and effects. AOCO is our best solution to Benacerraf’s problem, a 
problem which has been historically problematic for the realists. With it out of the 
way, we can have a healthier debate between abstract realism and nominalism. Causal 
abstract objects have also been proposed by many philosophers in the past, so there is 
undeniably some support for it. We should accept the causal nature of abstract entities 
as soon as possible.
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Chapter 3 - Metaphysics 
 
 
There is a paradigm within philosophy that abstract objects are not part of the causal 
order, meaning that they cannot be part of causes nor effects. A big reason is that 
many philosophers define abstract objects that way, but I’ve tried to show that there 
are reasons to think otherwise. We now need to ask ourselves if this assumption holds 
water. The aim of this chapter is to answer any metaphysical objections to AOCO: the 
thesis that abstract objects are part of the causal order.  
 
In 3.1, I will consider four different causal theories and ask if they are consistent with 
AOCO. In the remaining sections, I will look for more general objections to AOCO. 
In section 3.2, I will consider direct objections to AOCO. However, since publications 
on this question are few and far between, I will draw arguments from another debate – 
the conversation surrounding whether abstract objects can make a difference (a 
broader claim than mine). We will see if any of these arguments can be transitioned to 
our debate in 3.3. In 3.4, we will investigate a problem regarding a special subset of 
abstract objects – ones that are necessary – and discuss whether these are problematic. 
Finally we will examine broad objections from nominalists and traditional Platonists 
in 3.5. Ultimately, none of these arguments should stop us from accepting AOCO. 
 
 
3.1. Causal Theories 
 
 
There are many causal theories that have been proposed. My aim in this part is to find 
whether any of these theories have problems with AOCO. Most of these theories have 
no problem with my proposal and only a minority – ones that aren’t particularly 
popular – are incompatible. I will analyse these causal theories accordingly. 
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3.1.1. Regularity Theory 
 
 
Traditional regularity theories originate from Hume. The basic idea of regularity 
theories is that causation involves a certain type of event necessarily following 
another type of event. In Hume’s own words: 
 
“We may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where all 
the objects, similar to the first, are followed by similar to the second.” 
(Hume, 1748/1975, p.76). 
 
When Hume talks about necessity, he is talking about nomic necessity.
113
 Something 
is nomically necessary iff it is necessary given by our natural laws. Hence regularity 
theories tend to involve conditions involving rules of nature. 
 
Let ‘c’ be the name of an event c, let ‘e’ be the name of an event e, let ‘L’ be some 
nonempty set of true law propositions, and finally let ‘F’ be some relevant set of 
background propositions about matters of particular fact.  
 
c causes e iff 
 
1) c occurs, 
2) e occurs, 
3) c is an event of type C 
4) e is an event of type E 
5) L and F jointly imply that whenever events of type C occur, events of type E 
follow, 
6) L and F jointly do not imply that an event of type E occurs, and 
7) F alone does not imply that whenever an event of type C occurs, an event of 
type E follows. 
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This is a standard formulation of a regularity theory. However, Hume claims that a 
spatiotemporal contiguity condition should also be an essential component.
114
 Firstly, 
causes and effects have to be spatially contiguous (i.e. next to each other) and this can 
be seen through experience. Even when we think events at a distance are causally 
connected, this can be explained through causal chains. Contiguity is hence essential 
to causation. Causes must also occur before the effect. This is important for Hume, 
otherwise we could not distinguish the cause from the effect. Therefore Hume’s 
regularity theory requires an eighth condition: 
 
8) c and e are spatiotemporally contiguous. 
 
A strength of the regularity theory is that it has no problems with redundant causation 
unlike the counterfactual theory of causation for example. Regularity theories allow 
for multiple causes leading to the same effect. An analysis of what causes someone to 
drink a cold beverage for example would have multiple sufficient causes such as 
being thirsty, being in the heat, wanting a drink to accompany lunch etc., and each of 
these conditions can necessitate the effect. Regularity theories can hence 
accommodate cases with more than one possible cause.  
 
An event is a cause of e if and only if it is one of the sufficient conditions. Any c that 
necessarily leads to e is a sufficient condition for e. This is a strength not all causal 
theories have and it gives us more reason to respect the regularity theory. It also has 
an intuitive appeal. If one thing caused another, the latter had to happen. Outside of 
the philosophy classroom, this seems like a decent way of describing causation.  
 
Does the regularity theory have a problem with efficacious abstract objects? 
Surprisingly, even with the contiguity condition, we can have certain types of abstract 
objects being efficacious. Certain tropes for example should be allowed. Let’s say that 
‘the weakness of the bridge made the travellers fall’. We can certainly imagine cases 
where given the weakness of the bridge (a trope), the travellers had to fall. Other 
abstract objects however will be rejected as causal entities. One reason for this is the 
contiguity condition.  It is hard to imagine how linguistic types viewed as universals 
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for example can ever satisfy the contiguity condition. Linguistic types have no spatial 
properties, so by nature, they can’t be contiguous. 
 
However does the regularity theory really need these spatiotemporal limitations? 
Hume’s own arguments on this matter are fairly weak. He claims that spatial 
contiguity is necessary in causation because all our everyday causal cases follow that 
pattern. This argument is not very persuasive, as frequency should not imply 
necessity. In other words, Hume has made the observation that all our every day 
causal stories involve objects that are next to each other. However it is a big jump 
from this observation to the claim that spatiotemporal contiguity is necessary within 
causation. For example, can we not imagine a possible world in which I can move 
objects that are far away from me, without any long causal links existing within the 
space between us? This is possible, even if can only occur in a world that is distant to 
us. A good theory of causation should involve these possibilities, as these possibilities 
do not clash with the concept of causation.  
 
Unfortunately, rejecting the contiguity condition does not help us much. There is an 
additional hurdle for philosophers who accept AOCO – the condition of nomic 
necessity. Take fictional characters for example, can they nomically necessitate 
anything? This seems unlikely. If we say that ‘the fact that Harry Potter went to 
Hogwarts caused Suzy to buy a wizard hat’, are we saying that the latter had to 
happen given the laws of nature? No we are not. In fact it is very difficult to imagine a 
situation where fictional characters would nomically necessitate anything. We can say 
the same about linguistic entities. Therefore regularity theories are compatible with a 
few causal abstract objects, but not all of them. This could be worrying for anyone 
who accepts AOCO but are anti-realists about tropes for example. 
 
A problem with the regularity theory is that not all examples of causation involve the 
effect being nomically necessitated. The fact that I forgot to bring an umbrella may 
cause me to get soaked by the rain, but that does not mean that me being soaked was 
necessitated by the fact that I didn’t bring an umbrella. John Mackie has an adjusted 
version of the regularity theory that deals with this. 
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3.1.2. INUS Condition 
 
 
There is a close cousin to the standard regularity theory which still tries to explain 
causation in terms of necessary or sufficient conditions. This theory includes the 
concept of INUS conditions, put forth by John Mackie. 
 
An INUS condition is an insufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but 
sufficient condition. For any given effect, there can be many unnecessary but 
minimally sufficient conditions. In the case of a forest fire, a fire could be caused by a 
match being lighted and thrown on the ground, but a fire could also be started by a 
heat wave; or a teenager with a flamethrower; and so on. All of these minimally 
sufficient but unnecessary conditions can be combined to form one necessary and 
sufficient condition such that event e occurs iff 
 
1) d occurs and f occurs, or 
2) g occurs, h occurs and i occurs, or 
3) j occurs, k does not occur, l occurs etc. 
 
where ‘d’, ‘f’, ‘g’... etc. are all individual events. 
 
Take any one of these sufficient but unnecessary conditions, d and f both occurring 
for example, d occurring here is an insufficient but necessary part of both d and f 
occuring. d occurring here is an INUS condition of e. 
 
In the formula above, we can obviously call the entire antecedent a cause of e. 
However, most of what we call ‘causes’ are not complex disjuncts of this sort. When 
we say that something’s a cause, we often mean that it is an INUS condition. In our 
example involving the forest fire, the lighting of the match was a cause of the fire. 
This was obviously not a necessary and sufficient condition of the forest catching fire, 
but it was an INUS condition. Note that Mackie does not think that these cases 
exhaust are the only examples of causation,
115
 but since the term ‘causation’ can be 
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ambiguous, we will only focus here on the type of causes that Mackie is concerned 
with. 
 
Continuing with our original terminology, let ‘c’ be the name of an event c, let ‘e’ be 
the name of an event ‘e’; furthermore, let ‘X’ stand for the unnecessary but sufficient 
condition that contains c (eg. if c = α, X = [both d and f occurring]), and let ‘Y’ be the 
combination of all the other unnecessary but sufficient conditions ([g occurring, h 
occurring, and i occurring] & [j occurring, k not occurring, l occurring]… etc.). The 
INUS theory can be formulised as follows: 
 
 c causes e iff 
 
1) c is at least an INUS condition of e, 
2) all the components of X (including c) occurred, and 
3) every disjunct in Y that does not involve c was absent on this occasion.116 
 
In our example, we can therefore say that the lighting of the match was a cause of the 
fire.  
 
An advantage of Mackie’s theory is that he allows for causes that weren’t universally 
necessary for the effect. Note that the lighting of the match was not a necessary or 
sufficient condition for the fire starting. The fire would not have started if the match 
was lit but was not thrown into the ground, yet given that it was thrown on the 
ground, we would still want to call the lighting of the match a cause. The standard 
regularity theory cannot account for these types of causes as it requires a cause to 
necessitate the effect. This gives Mackie’s theory some advantages.  
 
Would this theory of causation be compatible with abstract objects being part of the 
causal order? Yes it would be, at least for certain types of abstract objects. The fact 
that Harry Potter is a wizard, the prevalence of pop culture stores in town, Suzy’s love 
for Harry Potter etc. form a minimally sufficient condition for her to buy a wizard hat. 
It follows that she would not have bought this wizard hat if Harry was not a wizard, so 
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the fact that Harry is a wizard is an INUS condition. This fact about a fictional 
character hence counts as a cause of Suzy buying the wizard hat (hopefully the reader 
will grant me that facts about fictional characters are also abstract). We can imagine 
other cases of the sort with other abstract objects. 
 
 
3.1.3. Energy Transfer View 
 
 
There is a theory of causation that is inconsistent with AOCO more directly than the 
regularity theory. David Fair’s analysis of causation states that causal connections can 
be explained by a flow of energy or momentum from the cause to the effect. This is a 
theory of causation that could potentially directly contradict AOCO.  
 
“I will argue that physical science has discovered the nature of the causal 
relation for a large class of cases. As a first approximation, it is a 
physically-specifiable relation of energy-momentum flow from the objects 
comprising cause to those comprising effect. The causal relation of 
ordinary language seems likely to be reducible to that relation” (Fair, 
1979, p.220). 
 
Although other causal theorists like to specify their causal relata as propositions or 
events, Fair is not so specific. Instead, he introduces the distinction between A-objects 
and B-objects. A-objects are the combination of events, actions, mental states and 
facts that comprise any cause A, B-objects are the same but for any effect B.
117
 For 
the sake of semantic consistency, I will use the terms c-objects and e-objects instead, 
with c and e being whatever that manifest these objects respectively. Here is an 
example, take the proposition ‘John shooting the gun caused Bob to die’; using our 
terminology, c is John shooting the gun and e is Bob dying, that much is clear. Now 
furthermore, John’s mental states, the pulling of the trigger, the bullet itself etc. are 
the c-objects. Likewise, Bob’s heart stopping, his loss of consciousness, the fact that 
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he is no longer alive etc. are the e-objects. We can say that c-objects are the different 
components of c, and the same with e-objects and e. 
 
According to Fair’s energy transfer view, 
 
c causes e iff there are physical redescriptions of c and e such that transfers in energy 
or momentum occur from the c-objects to the e-objects. 
 
It is important to note that Fair himself never claimed to have found a theory that 
covers all cases of causation. The energy transfer view however does cover a large 
proportion of causal stories.
118
 This theory will appeal to those who are especially 
scientifically minded. Many would argue that causation involving a chain of energy or 
momentum is the only form of causation. What better way to explain physical 
causation than through physical means?  
 
Can Fair’s theory of causation account for abstract objects being efficacious? Abstract 
objects obviously contain no mass, therefore any talk about energy flow or 
momentum would not apply to it. However, since Fair never claims to cover all cases 
of causation with his energy transfer view, it is at least possible for Fair’s view to 
coexist with AOCO. This is a surprising result, but an encouraging one. 
 
 
3.1.4. Counterfactual Theory 
 
 
The counterfactual theory is by far the most prominent analysis of causation today. 
This theory is naturally built around counterfactuals. The motivation behind this 
theory is intuitive – if one event caused another, perhaps the second event would not 
have occurred if the first event never happened.
119
 This helps us explain the force of 
causation.  
 
                                                 
118
 Fair, 1979, p.220. 
119
 Lewis, 1973, p.562-3. 
78 
 
Let ‘c’ be the name of an event c and ‘e’ be the name of an event e. According to the 
counterfactual theory of causation, we can say that 
 
c causes e iff  
 
1) Both c and e occur; and 
2) If c had not occurred, e would not have occurred either. 
 
David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker use possible worlds to explain counterfactuals. 
There are an infinite amount of possible worlds, such that any possibility that our 
universe could be or could have been is exemplified. However, only one world is 
actual – our world, though this does not mean that our world is metaphysically 
unique. We just happen to be in this world, much like how I happen to be in my room, 
which does not grant my room any sort of special status. All other worlds are ranked 
in terms of closeness i.e. some worlds are more like our world than others.
120
 
However, Stalnaker and Lewis account do have important differences. Stalnaker 
believes that there is such a thing as the closest possible world,
121
 whereas Lewis 
doesn’t. He just believes that worlds are loosely ranked in terms of closeness,122 so the 
concept of the one closest possible world is not meaningful to him. This leads to 
different treatment for 2 in CTC. 
 
Let ‘@’ be the actual world, Lewis states that 
 
2L) there is a world in which both c & e do not occur that is closer to @ than any 
world in which c does not occur and e does.
123
 
 
Whereas given Stalnaker’s treatment of possible worlds, 
 
2S) in the closest world to @ in which c does not occur, e does not occur either. 
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Therefore it’s possible for c not to cause e, but that possibility is one that is far away 
and alien to our situation.  
 
There are plenty advantages to a counterfactual theory of causation. First of all, unlike 
the regularity theory, effects do not need to be nomically necessitated. It has an 
advantage over Fair’s energy transfer view in the fact that not all causal stories 
involve strongly physical components. For example, the anger of a nation caused the 
civilians to revolt, yet there is no physical energy flow between the civilian’s anger 
and the revolution. It is also a methodologically simpler theory than Mackie’s theory; 
this makes the counterfactual theory an appealing one. 
 
Let us take a look at the objections to the counterfactual theory of causation. One of 
the most popular objections is the problem of redundant causation. There are two 
types of cases we have to deal with – causal overdetermination and pre-emption. Let 
us start with pre-emption. These are cases where an event c seems to cause event e, 
but had c not occurred, another event d would have caused e to occur later. For 
example, both Billy and Suzy throw rocks at a bottle. Suzy’s rock hits the bottle first 
and breaks it, but if Suzy’s rock hadn’t hit the bottle, Billy’s rock would have broken 
it nonetheless. This is a problematic case with the counterfactual theory of causation 
because Lewis and his supporters would want to say that Suzy caused the bottle to 
break, yet in the closest possible worlds that Suzy does not throw a rock, the window 
still breaks. The counterfactual test hence fails.
124
  
 
Lewis solves this problem by arguing that Suzy breaking the window and Billy 
breaking the window are two distinct events.
125
 Since redundant causation only occurs 
when the same event has multiple causes, cases of pre-emption do not qualify. The 
Billy and Sally story for example is only an example of two separate causal stories.  
 
The problem of causal overdetermination is trickier. These cases involve two events c 
and d seemingly causing an effect e simultaneously.  
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Two electrons, C1 and C2 fire simultaneously and stimulate neuron N at the same 
time. Did CI cause stimulation in N? Well, had C1 not occurred, C2 would have 
stimulated N nonetheless, so the counterfactual test fails. What makes cases of causal 
overdetermination different from pre-emption is that the counterfactual theorist 
cannot argue that C1 and C2 cause separate effects. Therefore, these cases require 
another type of solution. Martin Bunzl argues that we should be suspicious to whether 
or not there are genuine cases of overdetermination.
126
 With this current example, C1 
and C2 together cause a distinct effect, one that is different from the effect that C1 or 
C2 alone would have produced.
127
 Therefore had C1 not occurred, the neuron would 
be stimulated by a completely different event. We can do something similar with all 
the other proposed cases of causal overdetermination, therefore cases of 
overdetermination can be explained away. Of course, one may not be persuaded by 
Bunzl. One may find this argument pedantic and insist that C1 and C2 together do not 
cause a distinct effect. 
 
McDermott shows that Bunzl events don’t always solve the problem of causal 
overdetermination. Let us change the previous case slightly; two electrons, C1 and C2 
fire simultaneously and stimulate neuron N at the same time. Furthermore, neuron N 
responds in precisely the same way here as what would have happened if only C1 or 
C2 have fired. Therefore the stimulation the neuron receives from (C1 & C2), C1 
alone, and C2 alone are not distinct. We therefore cannot explain away this type of 
causal overdetermination in the way Bunzl wants to. 
 
Lewis himself has an odd way of dealing with cases of causal overdetermination. He 
argues that in these tougher cases, it is not clear what our intuitions say. Some would 
want to say that only Sally throwing the rock was a cause in the window breaking, 
others may argue that both Sally and Billy throwing the rock were causes. Some may 
even say that neither were causes. In these hard cases, the theory of causation can say 
whatever it wants. It gets to decide what counts as causes and what does not. “Such 
cases can be left as spoils to the victor” (Lewis, 1986b, p.194). 
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Lewis’ response is decent, but it leaves certain puzzles. Many philosophers would 
intuitively believe that both C1 and C2 were causes of the stimulation of N. However, 
they cannot explain this intuition right now with the counterfactual theory of 
causation. I will make an attempt in amending this. Additionally, it would nice if this 
solution gives us an alternative solution to cases of pre-emption. I will hence propose 
a model of redundant causation – a concept that involves both pre-emption and 
overdetermination. 
 
A good causal analysis of the C1 and C2 story should not just include one of the 
electrons, but both, showing the total causal story. Part of adequately describing this 
example is showing that either C1 or C2 would have caused the same stimulation by 
themselves. Furthermore, we have to show that if none of the causes involved in 
causing the stimulation of N occurred, (that is, C1 and C2), N would not have 
occurred. This much should be obvious. These are all conditions that should be 
involved in a model of causal overdetermination. 
 
Let ‘c’ be the name of an event c, ‘e’ be the name of an event e, and finally, let ‘X’ be 
the combination of two or more non-e events. I therefore propose the following model 
of redundant causation: 
 
Effect e was the result of redundant causation iff there was a combination of events X 
such that 
 
1. The events in X and e occurred,  
2. If the events in X had not occurred, e would not have occurred, and 
3. If any one or more of the events in X had occurred, e would still have 
occurred. 
 
With this amendment, McDermott’s case, as well as all other examples of 
overdetermination can now be accounted for. We will now add this to our 
counterfactual theory of causation: 
 
c causes e iff either 
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1) Both c and e occurred, and 
2) If c had not occurred, e would not have occurred either,  
or 
3) c was part of X, and 
4) e was the result of redundant causation due to the events involved in X. 
 
 
There are other counterexamples involving the problem of transitivity. There is a man 
in an electric chair and two men with switches in front of them. When the switches 
are placed in the same position, the man in the chair receives a shock. The first man 
does not want the man in the chair to receive a shock, but he nonetheless has to make 
a move and so flicks the switch to the right. The second man actually wants to 
electrocute the man in the chair, so he also flicks his switch to the right and the 
delivers a shock.
128
 The first man caused the second man to flick the switch to the 
right, and the second man caused the man in the chair to get electrocuted, yet it is 
counter-intuitive to say that the first man – who did not want any torture to happen, 
caused the man in the chair to get electrocuted. 
 
The way this counterexample works is that it takes advantage of the fact that Lewis 
allows for causal chains. Let ‘f’ be an event f, ‘g’ be an event g, and ‘h’ be an event h. 
If f causes g and g causes h, then g causes h. We are hence given cases where f causes 
g, g causes h, yet we are not prepared to say that f causes h. There are ways to fix this 
problem using counterfactuals. Did the first man cause the man in the chair to get 
electrocuted? Putting everything aside, if we use the counterfactual test, we would say 
no. Regardless of what the first man does, the second man would’ve moved his switch 
in a way that electrocutes the man in the chair. Therefore, anything the first man does 
is causally irrelevant. We can simply add a condition to the rules involving causal 
chains to prevent this from happening. 
 
If f causes g and g causes h, then f causes h unless it is proven that f cannot cause h 
once we remove the transitivity of causal chains.
129
   
 
                                                 
128
 McDermott, 1995, p.532. 
129
 Lewis for example argues for this in 1973, p.563. 
83 
 
Many of these counterexamples to the counterfactual theory of causation can be 
solved with counterfactual tools. Therefore they should not pose serious threats to the 
counterfactual theory of causation.  
 
Does this theory have any issues with abstract objects being part of the causal order? I 
see no reason why there it would be. Abstract objects can form part of the antecedent 
in counterfactual stories, much like concrete objects. If Harry Potter did not go to 
Hogwarts, Suzy would not have bought her wizard hat. The most popular causal 
theory today therefore can accommodate efficacious abstract objects. 
 
Most of the causal theories covered allow for at least some abstract objects to be part 
of the causal order. The only exception to the rule here is the energy transfer view, 
which is not a widely accepted causal theory. Even then, we have seen that it is at 
least possible for AOCO and Fair’s view to coexist. I therefore conclude that AOCO 
does not clash with our theoretic conceptions of causation. 
 
 
3.2. Azzouni’s Objections 
 
 
There have not been many publications on my topic. The two publications I could 
find are from Benjamin Callard and Jody Azzouni, one arguing for AOCO (roughly) 
and another objecting to it. Callard has argued a very closely related position to mine. 
He states that there is no reason a priori that abstract objects cannot be part of the 
causal order.  
 
“Conceptually speaking, there is, on reflection, simply no problem at all 
with the idea of something being affected by an entity radically dissimilar 
from it. In particular, there is no problem with the idea of abstract objects 
effecting changes in us; there is no conceptual difficulty with the idea that 
they impart energy to our brains, and that they do this ‘at a distance’, i.e., 
without the benefit of contiguity relations” (Callard, 2007, p.354-5).  
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He focuses on the possibility of causation from a distance and argues that though one 
can argue against it through empirical means, there is no reason a priori that this is 
not possible.
130
 Azzouni responded in a paper that challenges Callard to show how 
such causation could happen. For Azzouni, the mere logical possibility is not enough. 
It is not acceptable to try and explain phenomena with answers that create more 
metaphysical problems.
131
 
 
Azzouni argues that it is mysterious how the same abstract object can have different 
spatiotemporal relations to different people. He asks us to imagine that he has a 
perfect duplicate. Azzouni thinks of a number and after some time, in a different 
place, his duplicate thinks of the number as well. The same number therefore shares 
different relational properties between Azzouni and his duplicate. However, these 
differences are purely spatiotemporal. This is problematic, because numbers do not 
have any spatiotemporal properties, and hence, there should not be any differences in 
spatiotemporal relations between different people and the number. Yet, this is the sort 
of causal interaction that AOCO leads to (though neither Callard nor Azzouni use my 
terminology).
132
 
 
This objection in its current form is easy to dismiss. The problem with this argument 
is that there is a difference between the properties of an object and the properties of 
the thoughts regarding that object. Suppose a group of doctors were discussing their 
brain-dead patients. These doctors hence think about people that are incapable of 
thinking. By Azzouni’s logic, this story would be full of contradictions, but of course 
it is not! The reason is simple - there is a difference between the properties of the 
subject and the properties of the thoughts about subject. Bringing this back to 
Azzouni’s original counterexample, just because numbers do not have any 
spatiotemporal properties, that does not mean that the thoughts about numbers cannot.  
 
Luckily for Azzouni, his counterexample can be adjusted to deal with this type of 
attack. Two renowned writers create scripts based on Sherlock Holmes. The first 
writer writes a script for the Sherlock Holmes movies, played by Robert Downey Jr. 
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In another place and another time, the second writer creates a script for the television 
series – Sherlock. The work of fiction was therefore exemplified at different places 
and at different times. How can something without spatiotemporal properties such as 
fictional characters hold different spatiotemporal relations with different objects, 
when these relational properties should be the same?  
 
 
To this I have two answers. First of all there is some general confusion that comes 
with saying that abstract objects exist outside of space of time. This can be true 
without meaning that there exists a separate realm or a dimension where Sherlock 
Holmes for example resides in. All it means is that we can find the Sherlock Holmes 
anywhere, at any time. Therefore the abstract object can be non-spatiotemporal and 
yet we can interact with it in different places and at different times. 
 
In case the reader is not impressed by my last argument, here is another. There have 
historically been many causal connections which we acknowledge, yet we had no 
viable explanation for them at the time. An ancient astronomer may know that the 
Earth orbits the sun for example, yet have no idea how this occurs. Nonetheless, he 
was right; it just meant that there were further puzzles to answer afterwards. Likewise, 
this mystery that comes with how these entities cause should not be blown out of 
proportion. If abstract objects do in fact exist, I have provided reasons why they are 
part of the causal order. If one is not satisfied as to how this causal process happens, 
that simply means we have more work to do. That does not mean that abstract objects 
do not have any causal powers. Azzouni’s challenge towards the AOCO can therefore 
be answered. 
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3.3. Arguments from Make-No-Difference 
 
 
My main causal theory does not seem to clash with any of the main causal theories 
and Azzouni’s objection can be dealt with. Unfortunately, there has not been much 
discussion about this question among philosophers, so we are limited when it comes 
to objections. Similar questions however have been made on whether an abstract 
object can make a difference. This is a broader question as something can make a 
difference without it doing so causally. Ultimately, I do not believe there is a good 
argument against AOCO because a) the arguments from MND cannot be applied to 
our discussion and b) whether or not an abstract object plays a causal role cannot be 
shown definitely. I will list the points made for the make-no-difference argument, 
change them to fit the context of out debate and judge whether or not we should take 
these threats seriously. 
 
The following arguments are all from Mark Balaguer and objected by Alan Baker. 
The first what Baker calls the ‘blinking out argument’. Assume that Platonic entities 
exist (Balaguer was talking about mathematical entities, specifically), now imagine if 
all these entities suddenly disappeared. The physical world would stay exactly the 
same. This suggests that abstract objects make no difference in our world. 
 
“We can think of it this way: if all the objects in the mathematical realm 
suddenly disappeared, nothing would change in the psychical world; thus, 
if empirical science is true right now, then its nominalistic content would 
remain true, even if the mathematical realm disappeared; but this suggests 
that if there never existed any mathematical objects to begin with, the 
nominalistic content of empirical science could nonetheless be true” 
(Balaguer, 1998, p.132). 
 
Baker argues that it is problematic to think of Platonic entities coming in and out of 
existence. These entities exist necessarily; it makes no sense to say that the number 5 
came into existence. Therefore the premise of the blinking out argument is flawed and 
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cannot be adjusted to argue against the make-no-difference argument.
133
 Baker’s point 
is a strong one, but it is not one we can use in our debate. Baker and Balaguer are 
debating the properties of a certain brand of abstract objects – ones that cannot come 
in and out of existence. However, our debate covers entities such as fictional 
characters and tropes, which can come in and out of existence. Therefore, Baker’s 
argument cannot be applied here. However, perhaps we now have a simple solution to 
the blinking out argument. If the strength of the bridge disappeared, the bridge would 
probably fall. It is hence easier to see how a contingent abstract object would 
influence the world causally. Can we now show that all abstract objects do have 
causal powers? Unfortunately not. Although we can make sense of how certain 
abstract entities are causal, this does not apply to all abstract objects. Abstract objects 
that exist necessarily are especially problematic because we have problems 
understanding the counterfactual involved. This will be explained more later. 
 
The second argument is named the ‘irrelevance argument’. Balaguer argues that 
abstract objects cannot make a difference by referencing their usage in science.
134
 
Baker reformulates Balaguer’s argument thusly: 
 
1) Scientists apparently ‘know’ that mathematical objects are acausal. 
2) So science does not assign any causal powers to mathematical entities. 
3) So science predicts that the behaviours of the physical world are not dependent 
upon the existence of mathematical entities. 
4) This suggests that what science says about the physical world could be true 
even if mathematical entities did not exist.
135
 
 
In other words, abstract objects don’t seem to be crucial to scientific explanations. 
Baker sees two problems with this argument, the first between point 2 and point 3, the 
next with the strength of conclusion 4. With the former, point 2 specifies a causal 
dependence, whereas point 3 says the physical aren’t dependent of the mathematical 
in ‘any way at all’. Baker shows that the physical can depend on the mathematical 
without any causal relations, for example the proposition ‘the physical system S is 40 
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degrees Celsius’ depends on the number 40 playing the ‘Celsius relation to the 
physical system’, yet there is no causal dependence between the two. With the latter, 
conclusion 4 only says that the physical world could be the same if the mathematical 
world was any different, but that is not enough. That does not entail that mathematical 
objects don’t make a difference. It may be the case that they do make a difference, but 
the physical world may be the same through some other means if mathematical 
objects didn’t exist.136 
 
The latter point is fair; the irrelevance argument does not prove that abstract objects 
do not make a difference. What it does is it leaves us with an agnostic conclusion – 
we cannot tell if abstract objects make a difference or not. What the MND theorists 
need is some sort of Ockham’s razor argument to go with it. This seems like a 
plausible option, especially if we want to use this argument in the causal debate; it is 
metaphysically simpler if we don’t have to show how abstract objects are involved in 
causal chains. The other point Baker raised however unveils a problematic issue. 
Balaguer is accused of arguing for MND based on abstract objects not being causally 
responsible and this may be a dangerous move, but let us pause for a moment. The 
fact that this argument requires abstract objects to be causally inept is alarming. 
Premise 2 assumes that abstract objects are acausal, but given that our aim is to prove 
or disprove the causal powers of abstract objects, we surely cannot just assume that 
they don’t! We therefore cannot use the irrelevance argument in our causal debate 
because to accept the premise would be a circular argument. Arguments from MND 
simply don’t transition well to our debate. There is however, a problem that is raised 
by Baker (2003) in the MND debate that may give AOCO trouble. I will explain this 
argument next, as well as a similar problem involving counterpossibles. 
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3.4 Counterfactuals with Necessary Abstract Entities 
 
 
Let’s say that we wanted to test if abstract objects that exist necessarily such as 
numbers have any causal powers. Once we try to apply Lewis’ counterfactual test, we 
realise that this is simply impossible to prove using counterfactuals. There are two 
reasons for this, one including counterpossibles and the other involving counterlegals. 
I will go through both problems.  
 
Let us begin with counterpossibles. A counterpossible is a conditional with a 
necessary antecedent. We can take numbers here for example and set up a 
counterpossible counterfactual: 
 
If Pythagoras’ theorem is true, the bridge will be sturdy. 
 
Let us try and apply Lewis’ counterfactual test. We will start by denying the 
antecedent. Unfortunately, this is as far as we can go. We cannot deny the antecedent 
because the antecedent is necessarily true. There are no possible worlds in which 
Pythagoras’ theorem is false; it is true in all possible worlds. Therefore we cannot 
apply Lewis’ test. Whether or not these objects are causal therefore remain a mystery.  
 
Let us suppose, just hypothetically, that we can indeed apply the counterfactual test. 
For example, Pythagoras’ theorem may not exist in all possible worlds, so there are 
worlds in which we can deny the antecedent. We would still be in a sticky situation 
because of the nature of counterlegals. A counterlegal is a counterfactual that involves 
a change of our natural laws. A weak counterlegal is one that involves a natural law 
changing at some point in time, whereas a strong counterlegal involves us imagining a 
natural law that was always different. When we are imagining worlds in which 
Pythagoras’ theorem is false, we are hence dealing with a strong counterlegal. Baker 
argues that these strong counterlegal situations involving necessary abstract objects 
are neither true nor false because we simply do not know what denying the antecedent 
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would entail.
137
 The only things we can know in strong counterlegals are analytic 
truths based on the antecedent. Of course, propositions involving concrete objects 
such as whether or not our bridges will fall do not follow by definition, given that 
Pythagoras’ theorem is false. Therefore we cannot say that these abstract objects are 
causal or causal.
138
 
 
This is neither an argument in favour of or against AOCO. It simply states that we 
should be agnostic about when it comes to certain abstract entities. There are still 
plenty of contingent abstract objects that we can prove to be causal, so AOCO 
remains intact. 
 
 
3.5. Nominalist and Traditional Platonist Objections 
 
 
AOCO will not appeal to nominalists for the simple reason that it is a realist thesis. 
The standard nominalist objection is that we simply do need to postulate abstract 
entities to explain our world. Ockham’s razor states that we should not postulate 
abstract objects without needing to. We can explain our world without postulating 
abstract objects, therefore we shouldn’t. I have three responses to this. First of all, 
notice that AOCO is not specific towards any particular type abstract object. 
Therefore, as long as we allow any abstract object within our ontology, AOCO should 
be considered. It is simply unrealistic for any nominalist to suggest that there are no 
abstract objects at all. Nominalists have tried to show how everything can be 
paraphrased while maintaining a functional metaphysics, but many of their attempts 
have been disappointing. Even Hatry Field could only paraphrase away a limited 
amount if mathematical statements. As long as we have to postulate some abstract 
objects, AOCO remains viable. Secondly, notice that this type of argument is not 
specific to ontological debates surrounding abstract objects. Common-sense anti-
realists have argued similarly that tables and chairs do not add any explanatory value 
either, when we already have smaller metaphysical components like atoms and 
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molecules. This is therefore really just an argument for an ontology composed of 
simples. In the same sense that we can still postulate tables and chairs despite already 
committing to atoms and molecules, we can commit to abstract objects despite 
committing to concrete entities. Finally, if it pleases the nominalists, view AOCO as a 
discussion that should occur before ontological debates. We can view AOCO as a 
methodological if-then-ist thesis. That is, if abstract objects do exist, I suggest that 
they should have causal powers.  Whether or not abstract objects exist is another 
matter but before we enter this debate, we need to define what properties abstract 
objects have. Any debates over the existence of abstract entities should involve them 
being causal; that is all AOCO needs to say. Nominalism hence should not directly 
clash with AOCO. 
 
The second objection is one that traditional Platonists and nominalists alike can make. 
They can argue that having abstract objects within the causal order is simply more 
complicated than having them being causally inert. We should not overcomplicate our 
metaphysics without good reasons, thus we should reject AOCO. My response is that 
after extended investigations, it simply makes more sense for these entities to be 
causal. Word types for example seem to obviously be decided by the linguistic 
community, and it seems equally obvious that this change then affects the way we 
communicate. It would be odd for us to have a view of causally efficacious linguistic 
types and this is equally true with certain other abstract objects. Furthermore, we have 
discussed all the different benefits of AOCO. There are good reasons for us to accept 
AOCO over the traditional Platonist model. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The aim of this chapter was to investigate any potential metaphysical problems with 
AOCO. We first looked at whether different theories of causation would be 
incompatible with this position. Although some theories cannot accompany abstract 
objects functioning within the causal order, the most prominent theory – the 
counterfactual theory, has no problems with it. We then looked at Azzouni’s direct 
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objection regarding non-spatiotemporal objects having different spatiotemporal 
relations and concluded that it could be answered. We tried to apply arguments from 
the make-no-difference debate, but these arguments either could not transition to ours 
or left us with an open question. Furthermore, we investigated questions concerning 
whether necessary abstract objects can be part of causation and decided that it was 
either not a problem, or simply an open question. Finally, traditional nominalist 
arguments do not pose a threat to AOCO. Until there are further metaphysical 
objections to the claim that abstract objects can be part of the causal order, it seems 
that we can answer any metaphysical queries that are raised. 
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Final Conclusion 
 
 
Abstract objects have long been assumed to be acausal, but as I have shown there are 
good reasons to reject this assumption. Firstly, there are already abstract objects 
postulated by philosophers that are part of the causal order. My claim also offers a 
simple solution to Benacerraf’s epistemic problem, which has been a thorn on the 
realists’ side for a long time. Finally, we looked at metaphysical objections to my 
AOCO including direct ones from Azzouni and showed that they can be dealt with. I 
thereby conclude that abstract objects are in fact part of the causal order, and that 
nominalists should at least view these entities as the ones they should deal with, as 
they pose a stronger threat than traditional Platonic objects. 
 
94 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
Alston, W.P. (1958). Ontological Commitments. Philosophical Studies, 9, 1-2, pp. 8-
17. 
 
Armstrong, D. M. (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University. 
 
Azzouni, J. (2008). A Cause for Concern: Standard Abstracta and Causation. 
Philosophia Mathematica, 16, 3, pp. 397-401. 
 
Baker, A. (2003). Does the Existence of Mathematical Objects Make a Difference?. 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81, 2, pp. 246-264.  
 
Balaguer, M. (1995). A Platonist Epistemology. Synthese, 103, 3, pp. 303-25. 
 
- (1998). Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Benacerraf, P. (1973). Mathematical Truth. The Journal of Philosophy, 70, 19, pp. 
661-79. 
 
Bigelow, J. (1988). The Reality of Numbers. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Bonjour, L. (1980). Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge. Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy, 5, 1, pp. 53–74. 
 
Brendel, E., & Jäger, C. (2004). Contextualist Approaches to Epistemology: Problems 
and Prospects. Erkenntnis, 61, 2-3, pp. 143-72. 
 
Brock, S. (2010). The Creationist Fiction: The Case against Creationism about 
Fictional Characters. Philosophical Review, 119, 3, pp. 337-64. 
95 
 
 
Bunzl, M. (1979). Causal Overdetermination. The Journal of Philosophy, 76, 3, pp. 
134-50. 
 
Burgess, J. (1983). Why I am not a Nominalist. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 
24, 1, pp. 93-105. 
 
Burgess, J., &Rosen, G. (1997). A Subject with No Object. Oxford: Claredon. 
 
Callard, B. (2007). The Conceivability of Platonism. Philosophia Mathematica, 15, 3, 
pp. 347-56. 
 
Cheyne, C. (2001). Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects: Causal Objections to 
Platonism. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
 
Chihara, C. S. (1982). A Godelian Thesis Regarding Mathematical Objects: Do They 
Exist? and Can We Perceive Them?. The Philosophical Review, 91, 2, pp. 211-27. 
 
Cohen, S. (1998). Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Skepticism, 
Gettier, and the Lottery. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76, 2, pp. 289–306. 
 
- (1999). Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of 
Reasons, Philosophical Perspectives, 13, pp. 57–89. 
 
Conee, E., & Feldman, R. (1985). Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies, 48, 1, pp. 15-
34. 
 
Cresswell, M. (2010). Abstract Entities in the Causal Order. Theoria, 76, pp. 249-65. 
 
Davidson, D. (1967). Causal Relations. The Journal of Philosophy, 64, 21, pp. 691-
703. 
 
Deutsch, H. (1991). The Creation Problem. Topoi, 10, 2, pp. 209–25. 
 
96 
 
Dummett, M. (1973). Frege – Philosophy of Language. London: Trinity. 
 
Dretske, F. (1970). Epistemic Operators. The Journal of Philosophy, 67, 24, pp. 
1007–23.  
 
- (1981). The Pragmatic Dimension of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 40, 3, 
pp. 363–78.  
 
Drivers, J., & Miller. A. (1999). Arithmetical Platonism: Reliability and Judgement-
Dependence. Philosophical Studies, 95, 3, pp. 277-310. 
Fair, D. (1979). Causation and the Flow of Energy. Erkenntnis, 14, 3, pp. 219-50. 
 
Feldman, R. (1999). Contextualism and Skepticism. Philosophical Perspectives, 13, 
pp. 91–114. 
 
Field, H. (1980). Science without Numbers. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
- (1984). Frege's Conception of Numbers as Objects by Crispin Wright. 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 14, 4, pp. 637-62. 
 
Gettier, E. (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?. Analysis, 23, 6, pp. 121-3. 
 
Gödel, K. (1951). Russell’s Mathematical Logic. In P.A. Schlipp (Eds), The Library 
of Living Philosophers – The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell (pp. 125-51). New 
York: Tudor. 
 
Goldman, A.H. (1988) Empirical Knowledge. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
 
Hale, B. (1987). Abstract Objects. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Hume, D. (1975). Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (3
rd
 ed.). Oxford: 
Clarendon. (Original work published 1748). 
 
97 
 
- (1978). A Treatise of Human Nature (2nd ed.). Oxford: Clarendon. (Original 
work published 1739). 
 
Jackson, F. (1980). Ontological Commitment and Paraphrase. Philosophy, 55, 213, 
pp. 303-15 
 
Kvart, I. (1996). A Theory of Counterfactuals. Indianapolis: Hackett 
 
Lewis, D. (1973). Causation. Journal of Philsophy, 70, 17, pp. 556-67. 
 
- (1986a). On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
- (1986b). Philosophical Papers: Volume II. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
  
- (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74, 4, pp. 
549–67. 
 
Liggins, D. (2006) Is There a Good Epistemological Argument against Platonism?. 
Analysis, 66, 2, pp.135–41. 
 
Linsky, B. & Zalta, E. (1995). Naturalized Platonism versus Platonized Naturalism. 
Journal of Philosophy, 92, 10, pp. 525-55. 
 
Mackie, J.L. (1965). Causes and Conditions. American Philosophical Quarterly, 2, 4, 
pp. 245-264. 
 
Maddy, P. (1981). Sets and Numbers. Noûs, 15, 4, pp. 495-511. 
 
- (1992). Realism in Mathematics. Oxford: Claredon Press. 
 
McDermott, M. (1995). Redundant Causation. The British Journal for the Philosophy 
of Science, 46, 4, pp. 523-44 
 
Noonan, H. W. (1978). Count Nouns and Mass Nouns. Analysis, 38, 4, pp. 167-72. 
98 
 
 
Plato (2005). Parmenides. In M. Cohen, P. Curd and C.D.C Reeve (Eds), Readings in 
Ancient Greek: From Thales to Aristotle – Third Edition (pp. 604-13). Cambridge, 
Indianapoli: Hackett Publishing Company. (Original work published ND). 
 
Quine, W.V. (1948). On What There Is. The Review of Metaphysics, (pp. 21-38), 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. 
 
- (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press. 
 
 
Rosen, G. (1990). Modal Fictionalism. Mind Association, 99, 395, pp. 327-54. 
 
- Abstract Objects. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 18 
March, 2012 from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/abstract-
objects. 
 
Stalnaker, R. (1968). A Theory of Conditionals. American Philosophical Quarterly, 5, 
2, pp. 98-112. 
 
Steiner, M. (1973). Platonism and the Causal Theory of Knowledge. The Journal of 
Philosophy, 70, 3, pp. 57-66. 
 
Van Inwagen, P (1977). Creatures of Fiction. American Philosophical Quarterly, 14, 
4, pp. 299-308. 
 
- (1983). Fiction and Metaphysics. Philosophy and Literature, 7, 1, pp. 67-77.  
 
- (1998). Meta-Ontology. Erkentnis, 48, 2-3, pp. 233-50. 
 
Wetzel, L. (2009). Types and Tokens: On Abstract Objects. London: MIT. 
 
99 
 
Williams, D. C. (1953a). The Elements of Being: I. The Review of Metaphysics, 7, 1, 
pp. 3-18. 
 
- (1953b). The Elements of Being: II. The Review of Metaphysics, 7, 2, pp. 171-
92. 
 
Wright, C. (1983) Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects. Aberdeen: Aberdeen 
University Press. 
 
Yablo, S. (2001). Go Figure: A Path Through Fictionalism. Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy, 25, 1, pp. 72-102. 
 
 
